Florida Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 3

Article 1

An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation
Nina J. Crimm

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A
Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 419 ().
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Crimm: An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable

Florida Law Review
VOLUME 50

JULY 1998

NUMBER 3

AN EXPLANATION OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A THEORY OF RISK COMPENSATION

Nina J.Crimm*
ABsTRACr ............................................. 420
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 421
L

MEANING OF "CHARITABLE" ORGANIZATION

FOR I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) PURPOSES ...................... 425

A.
B.

English Antecedents ofAmerican Law ............. 425
American Law ................................ 427

II. SCHOLARS' THEORIES OF TAX EXEMPTION
FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

.................... 430

A. Basic Notions ................................. 430
B. Subsidy Theory ................................ 430
C. Alternatives to Subsidy Theory ................... 431
1. Income Measurement Theory .................. 432
2. Capital Formation Theory and the
Nondistribution Constraint ................... 432
3. Altruism Theory ............................ 435
4. Donative Theory ........................... 435
D. Summary .................................... 439
11. PROPOSAL: RISK COMPENSATION THEORY .............. 439
A. Background .................................. 440
1. Market Failure and Government Failure ......... 440
2. Market and Governmental Mechanisms ......... 442
3. The Concept of Risk ........................ 443
a. Pure, Speculative, Systematic and

Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; A.B., Washington University
(1972); J.D. and M.B.A., Tulane University (1979); LL.M. in Taxation, Georgetown University
*

(1982).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. so

Diversifiable Risks ........................
443
443
(1) Definitions ...........................
444
(2) The Capital Asset Pricing Model .........
b. Application of Risk Concepts
446
and Capital Asset Pricing Model ............
(1) Risk Aversion and Venture Capitalists ..... 446
446
(2) Risk Aversion and Firm Behavior .........
(3) Connecting the Provision of Public
448
Goods and Services with Risk ...........
448
(a) The For-Profit Start-Up Firm .........
448
i. Pure Public Goods ..............
ii. Mixed Public Goods and Services .. 450
451
iii. Summary ......................
(b) The Nonprofit Charitable
Organization-Risk Compensation .... 452
4. Risk Compensation Theory as
454
Universally Defensible .......................
455
5. Deservedness-A Separate Issue ...............
a. In the Beginning-A Start-Up
455
Charitable Organization ....................
Phaseb. Beyond the Initial Start-Up
Evolution or the Cloning Effect? . . . . . . . . . . . . 457
461
c. Summary ...............................
CONCLUSION ...........................................

462

ABSTRACT

There currently is no universally-accepted theory that explains the
fundamentalreason underlyingthe deliberateand continuedconferralof
the federal income tax exemption on qualifying charitableorganizations.
This Article suggests that the rationalefor the tax exemption is a separate
issuefrom the question of whether a charitableorganizationdeserves tax
exempt treatment. As to the rationale,this Article proposes that the tax
exemption is a non-volatile expected return to compensate rational
charitable organizationsfor undertaking the provision of "inherently
risky" public goods and services. With respect to the issue of
deservedness, this Article looks at social and moral justifications and
suggests broadguidelinesbased on the types ofprojects undertakenas an
organization evolves, and the degree to which those activities comport
with the organization'sinitialpurpose constraint.
The Rosetta Stone, . . . whose text in hieroglyphics,

demotics [sic],and Greekwas the key to revealingthe stories
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of ancientEgypt, was in fact a grant of tax immunity. Which
is why, of course, it was engraved in stone andnot written on
papyrus.'
-Alvin Rabushka
INTRODUCTION

Governmental favoritism was conferred in America on non-proprietary
hospitals-a category of charitable organizations-even before the
Revolutionary War.2 Since the Civil War, general non-tax benefits3 and tax
1. SeeAs CertainAsDeath--QuotationsAboutTaxes, 77 TAX NOTES 1485,1500 (Dec. 29,
1997).
2. The tax exemption for hospitals in the United States was conferred prior to the
Revolutionary War. See W. HARRISON WELLORD&JANNEG. GAUAGHER, UNFAIR COMPETITION:
THE CHAL.ENGE TO CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 119-20 (1988); David A. Hyman, The
Conundrum of Charitability:Reassessing Tax Exemptionfor Hospitals, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 327,
334 (1990).
3. After the Civil War, nonprofit organizations received certain benefits unavailable to forprofit organizations. For example, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 exempted nonprofit organizations
from voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy, and as late as 1947, nonprofit institutions were exempt
from involuntary bankruptcy. See Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changesin the For-Profit
andNot-For-ProfitHealth CareDelivery Structures;a RegenerationofTax ExemptionStandards,
37B.C.LREV. 1,7-8 n.19 (1995); see also Bankruptcy Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176,337, 14 Stat.
517, 535 (1867), amended by Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839 (1910),
[repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (1947)]. Favored treatment also
extended to exemption from: Social Security taxes, see Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49
Stat. 620,625, § 201(b)(7) (1935), repealedby Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-21, § 102,97 Stat. 65,70-71 (1983); collective bargaining (created and later repudiated by the
National Labor Relations Board); federal unemployment insurance, see (Federal Unemployment
Tax Act of 1939, ch. 2,53 Stat. 183, 187, § 1607(c)(7) (1939); the minimum wage, see (29 C.F.R.
§ 779.214 (1970); [judicial interpretations] of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §§ 58, 12, 52 Stat. 1062-4 & 1067, (1938), amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(r), 75 Stat. 65,65 (1961); securities registration, see Securities Act of 1933,
ch. 38, § 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 74, 76 (1933); and unfair trade practice rules, see Federal Trade
Commission Act, ch. 311, § 4, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1986)). Moreover, nonprofits obtained favoritism under the copyright statutes, see Copyright Act
of 1947, ch. 391, § 1(c) & (e), 61 Stat. 652, 653 (1947), Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, §§ 110-112 & 118(d)(3), 90 Stat. 2541, 2549, 2551, 2559 & 2567 and by Act of Oct. 25,
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-366, § 3, 96 Stat. 1759, 1759 (1986), and pursuant to antitrust laws, see
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n. of Colleges & Secondary Schs., 432
F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Nonprofit organizations were even protected from tort liability
under the judicially created doctrine of charitable immunity. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1069 (5th ed. 1984); Note, The Quality of Mercy:
'CharitableTorts'andTheirContinuingImmunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1982-86 (1987). For
further discussion of the favored treatment of nonprofit organizations during the period of 18501950, see Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations:Do Current Trends
Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 807, 810-12 (1988-89).
The list of favored treatment for nonprofit organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) has
declined over the past thirty years. For example, the charitable immunity doctrine is largely
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advantages4 available to charitable organizations have not been bestowed
unavailable. See Note, supra, at 1382, 1385. The antitrust laws now are applied with vigor to
nonprofit organizations. See Hansmann, supra, at 817. Enforcement of the antitrust laws to mergers,
acquisitions, and joint ventures of hospitals and other health care institutions has been increased,
and has received much attention lately. See Kevin J. Arquit, Developments and Trends in FTC
Antitrust Enforcement, 847 PRACTISING LAW INST. CORP. LAW AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 653,653-67 (June-July 1994); Fredric J. Entin et al., HospitalCollaboration:TheNeedfor
anAppropriateAntitrustPolicy,29 WAKEFORESTL. REV. 107 (1994); William G. Kopit & Robert
W. McCann, Towarda DefinitiveAntitrustStandardforNonprofitHospitalMergers, 13 J.HEALTH
POL, POL'Y & LAW 635 (1988); William T. Lifland, Monopolies and Joint Ventures, 846
PRACrISING LAW INST. CORP. LAW AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 141,255-61 (June-July
1994); DaynaB. Matthew, Doing What Comes Naturally:Antitrust Law andHospitalMergers,31
HouS. L. REV. 813 (1994); David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick) Rule. Health Care Collaboration
Does Not Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169 (1994); Owen S.
Mudge, Jr. & Allan Gibofsky, The DevelopingApplicationofAntitrust Laws to HospitalMergers,
15 J.LEGALMED. 355 (1994) Judy L. Whalley, MergersandAcquisitionsUpdate,846 PRACTISING
LAW INST. CORP. LAW AND PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 317 (June-July 1994).
However, § 501(c)(3) organizations do retain favored treatment in certain areas of the law. For
example, the copyright laws, see 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (1988), and the minimum wage laws, see 29
U.S.C. § 203(r) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), interpretedby 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1994) continue to
favor these nonprofit organizations. Preferential postal rates are available (39 C.F.R. pt. 3001,
subpt. C., app. A, § 3000.0212 (1988)), as are volume discounts on commodities purchased foruse
by the nonprofit organization, see 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
4. The earliest history of the income tax exemption dates to an administrative ruling issued
during the Civil War, the only period prior to 1894 that an income tax was imposed by the United
States government. Pursuant to Treasury Decision 110, "the income of literary, scientific or other
charitable institutions, in the hands of trustees or others, is not subject to income tax." Treas. Dec.
110 (May 1863), cited in, Tax Reform of 1969: Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the Committee on
Ways and Means, House of'Representatives, 91 st Cong., 1stSess. 1425,1428 n.1 (1969) (statement
by Julius M. Greisman, Attorney, American Hospital Association). As part of The Tariff Act of
1894, Congress enacted the first federal income tax exemption for charitable organizations. See Act
of August 27, 1894, ch. 349,28 Stat. 509,556 (1894). One year later, the Supreme Court declared
the Tariff Act unconstitutional. See Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37
(1895). In 1909, The Payne Aldrich Tariff Act, which generally imposed an excise tax on "every
corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and having a capital stock
represented by shares," exempted from the excise tax, among other organizations, "any corporation
orassociation organized and operated exclusively forreligious, charitable, oreducational purposes,
no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual."
Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13 (1909). In 1913, Congress expanded the excise
tax exemption to include "any corporation or association -rganized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes." Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38
Stat. 114, 172 (1913). As part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, organizations exempt from
income taxation included "[c]orporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." Internal Revenue Code § 101(6), ch. 2, § 10, 53
Stat. 1, 33 (1939) (recodified as amended at I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954), Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat.
3). Numerous legislative provisions expanded the reach of the tax exemption, to include such
organizations as those that provide public safety testing [(Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948)];
and amateur sports organizations, see Tax Reform Act-of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,90 Stat. 1520,
1730 (1976). Prohibitions against legislative activities and lobbying has long been a part of the
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on for-profit entities. Perhaps the most famous financial benefits are the
federal income tax exemption granted to charitable organizations
approximately one hundred years ago pursuant to a predecessor provision
of current Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3),' and the federal
charitable income tax deduction given to donors eighty years ago under a
precursor to current I.R.C. § 170.6 State and local governments also
provide valuable exemptions from income, sales, and property taxes to
charitable organizations. 7 Today, these exemptions amount to over $36.5

statutory requirements for tax exemption of charitable organizations. (Added first as part of the
Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216,48 Stat. 680 (1934), and expanded greatly in subsequent
years, most recently in 1987 under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).) For furtherdetailed histories, see Kenneth Liles & CynthiaBlum,
Development of the FederalTax Treatment of Charities,39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (1975);
John P. Persons et al., CriteriaforExemptionUnderSection501(c)(3), Research Paper Sponsored
by Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (U.S. Dept. of Treas. 1977).
5. Among the special benefits currently applicable to I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) charitable
organizations are the following: exemption from income taxation, see I.R.C. § 501(a)(1998);
eligibility for the receipt of charitable contributions that are deductible by donors in calculating
income tax liability, see id. § 170, gift tax liability, see id. § 2522, and to reduce estate tax liability
by the value of a charitable bequest, see id. § 2055(a)(2); eligibility to raise capital through the
issuance of tax-exempt "qualified § 501(c)(3) bonds," see id. § 145; flexibility to structure certain
employee compensation plans, such as tax sheltered annuities, see id. § 403(b); exemption from the
federal unemployment payroll tax, see id. §§ 3301 and 3306(c)(8); and exemption from the
communications services excise tax, see id. § 4253(h). Although many jurisdictions continue to
exempt § 501(c)(3) organizations from state and local sales, income, and property taxes, some
jurisdictions have curtailed or begun programs scrutinizing this favoritism, especially with respect
to "charitable" nonprofit institutions. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(d) (West 1995); West
Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of Prop. Assessment, 455 A.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Pa. 1982); School Dist.
v. Hamot Med. Ctr., 602 A. 2d 407,413-15 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Hospital Utilization Project
v. Commonwealth, 461 A.2d 894,896-97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Utah County v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 276-78 (Utah 1985); see also Mark F. Baldwin, Legislatures,
Agencies DebatingWhetherNon-For-ProfitHospitalsDeserve TheirTax-Exempt Status, 17 MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1987, at 34 (noting that nonprofit hospitals are at risk of losing tax
exemptions); David A. Hyman & T.J. McCarthy, Property Tax Exemptions: Headed for
Extinction?, HEALTH PROGRESS, Dee. 1988, at 32 (noting that hospitals may lose property tax
exemption); Daniel P. Moskowitz, Strapped Governments Eye Nonprofit Hospitals,47 MED. &
HEALTH, Aug. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW, MEDHLTH data base, 1993 WL 2824098
(discussing heightened government scrutiny of nonprofit hospitals).
6. Congress first adopted a charitable contribution deduction in 1917. See War Revenue Act,
ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). Entities to which deductible contributions could be
made were "corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals." Id.
7. Government is the most valuable source of income for most types of nonprofit
organizations today, providing far more resources than private contributions. See Note, Lester M.
Salamon, Partnersin Public Service: The Scope and Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations,
in THE NONPROFr SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 99 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987); Joseph C.
Branch, Recent Decisions, Taxation: The Property Tax Exemption and Non-Profit Homesfor the
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billion per year in foregone tax revenues.'
The magnitude of the pecuniary benefit enjoyed by charitable
organizations because of various tax exemptions is enormous.9 With this
fact in mind, if we were to focus exclusively on the federal income tax
exemption, one of the largest exemptions, it may appear remarkable that
there is no universally-accepted theory to explain the fundamental reason
underlying the deliberate and continued conferral of that exemption on all
qualifying charitable organizations. Numerous scholars have offered
theories in attempts to provide the elusive explanation. As many or more
commentators have criticized those offerings. Because I too am so bold as
to think that I just might have a defensible theory, I am joining the ranks
of those who have dared to provide a cogent explanation. However, this is
not to think that my theory will not be critically examined.
As background, this Article begins in Part I with a brief explanation of
the definitional concept of "charitable" for purposes of the federal income
tax exemption. As will be made clear, the vagueness of its meaning is
central to scholarly attempts to rationalize the exemption. Part II presents
various major conventional and academic theories posed as explanations
for the federal income tax exemption. Commentary on these theories also
will be mentioned. Finally, in Part Ill, I present my own hypothesis, the
theory of risk compensation. This theory suggests that the tax exemption

Aged, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 140, 140-41 (1970); Rebecca S. Rudnick, State and Local Taxes on
Nonprofit Organizations,22 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 323 (1993); Note, Exemption of Educational,
Philanthropicand ReligiousInstitutionsFrom StateReal PropertyTaxes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 288,
288 (1950).
8. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 10 (1995). Revenue losses caused by a "special exclusion, exemption, or deduction
from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability" are considered tax expenditures and have been explicitly adopted by Congress and the
President in budget analysis as a result of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(16) (1988); 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (1988)). It has been predicted that for 1998 there will be
$3.2 billion in lost revenues from the I.R.C. § 170 charitable deduction; however, no projections
are made regarding the value of "lost revenues" attributable to the I.R.C. § 501 income tax
exemption. CONGRESsiONALBuDGET OFFIcE REPORTTO THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEEON
THE BUDGET, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS 243 (Mar. 1997) (relying
on information provided by Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 105th Cong., Estimates of
Federal Tax Expenditures For Fiscal Years 1998-2002). For 1998 through 2002, it has been
projected that $95.9 billion in lost revenues would result if the I.R.C. § 170 charitable deduction
were eliminated. Id. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has provided the explanation that
§ 501 organizations "are not treated as tax expenditures because the tax benefits are available to any
corporatioii that chooses to organize itself and operate in the required manner." Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures For Fiscal
Years 1993-1997, at 5 (Comm. Print 1992) (without entry for the § 501 organizations).
9. Put into context, the exemptions provided to charitable organizations that are "the
equivalent of the income taxes paid by 25 million taxpayers."
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is a non-volatile expected return to compensate rational charitable
organizations for undertaking the provision of "inherently risky" public
goods and services. Part III also suggests that the issue of an organization's
deservedness of the tax exemption must be separately addressed. It
proposes that the appropriate means for determining whether an
organization deserves the tax exemption requires taking into account an
organization's evolution, the need to maximize inter-generational utility,
and the application of dynamic gamesmanship theory.
I. MEANING OF "CHARriABLE" ORGANIZATION FOR
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) PURPOSES
A. EnglishAntecedents of American Law
The seeds of the tax exemption notion for American "charitable"
organizations can be traced to fourteenth century England.'0 It was not
until the seventeenth century that the first formal comprehensive list of
worthy charitable uses for money and property was enumerated. In the
preamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses which was enacted in
1601,11 among the uses cited as appropriate for a charitable trust were

10. In approximately 1362, William Langland wrote a poem, The Vision of Piers the
Plowman, which chronicles in one portion a means for wealthy merchants to save their souls by
dedicating their fortunes to:
repair hospitals
help sick people
mend bad roads
build up bridges that had been broken down
help maidens to marry or to make them nuns
find food for prisoners and poor people
put scholars to school or to some other craft
help religious orders, and
ameliorate rents or taxes.
Persons et al., supra note 4, at 1912 (quoting the modem English version of the "B" text of the
poem which was edited from numerous manuscripts by the Rev. Walter W. Skeat, 1:228, Oxford,
1886).
11. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601) (Eng.) was enacted as a supplement
to the comprehensive system of the Elizabethan Poor Laws adopted by Parliament in 1597 and
restated in 1601. Act for the Relief of the Poor, 43 Eliz., ch 2 (1601), reprintedin 7 Stat. at Large
30 (Eng. 1763). Under the 1597 laws, which addressed problems faced by destitute populations in
urban England, responsibility for relief of poverty was primarily imposed on local communities.
The communities had the power to tax for purposes of relieving poverty. See Persons et al., supra
note 4, at 1913. The Statute of Charitable Uses addressed "whether a trust which had no specific
beneficiary" should be recognized at common law when its intention was "to serve the poor, or to
maintain a local roadway" rather than a specific beneficiary. Oliver A. Houck, With CharityforAll,
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"relief of aged, impotent and poor people ...maintenance of sick and
maimed soldiers and mariners... aid and help of... persons decayed."12
Relying on this enumeration of appropriate charitable uses, a confused
body ofjudicial precedent developed in England concerning the parameters
of the legal concept of charity for trust law purposes. 3 At the end of the
nineteenth century, a decision written by Lord McNaughten in the now
famous Commissioners of Income Tax v. Pemsel,14 presented a unifying
theme for conceptualizing appropriate charitable uses under the laws of
trusts:
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions:
trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of
education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts
for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling
under any of the preceding heads .... The trusts last referred
to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because
incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as
indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either
directly or indirectly. 5
As a result of the decision in the Pemsel case, the English courts uniformly
adopted this concept of charity for determining whether an organization6
was entitled to income tax exemption as a charitable organization.'
Initially, charitable trusts were the principal form of organization for
charitable activities. 7 By the second half of the nineteenth century,

93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1422 n.4 (1984). The "statute deemed that such a trust should be permitted."
Id. For a more detailed look at the statute of charitable uses, see generally MICHAEL CHESTERMAN,
CHARITIES, TRUSTS AND SOCIALWELFARE 54-58 (1979); GARETH JONES, HISTORY OFTHE LAW OF

CHARITY 1532-1827, at 22-25 (1969); L.SHERIDAN&G. KEETON, THE MODERNLAWOFCHARmES
8-9 (3d. ed. 1983).
12. Persons et al., supra note 4, at 1912-13 (citing GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 321, at 638 n.2 (1965)). This enumeration of
charitable uses in the preamble to the English Statute of Charitable Uses also included such
activities as maintaining schools of learning, repairing bridges, educating and aiding orphans, and
aiding the poor pay taxes. See id. at 1912-13. The preamble was not intended to be an exclusive list
of charitable purposes. See id. at 1913. Moreover, it has been determined that the list should be
viewed in the disjunctive, so that relief of the distress of the aged is an appropriate charitable
purpose per se. See Robert S. Bromberg, The CharitableHospital,20 CATH.U. L. REV. 237,24041(1970).
13. See Bromberg, supra note 12, at 240-41; Persons et al., supra note 4, at 1914-15.
14. 1891 App. Cas. 531.
15. Id. at 583.
16. Charitable organizations have been entitled to income tax exemption in England since
enactment of the first Income Tax Act of 1842. See Persons et al., supra note 4, at 1919.
17. See id. at 1917. The reason cited for primary use of the trust form was the flexibility
available to individuals to create trusts, whereas power to form corporations was concentrated in
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corporations were used increasingly in England for charitable activities."
B. American Law
Until the end of the Revolutionary War, the American colonies were
bound by English law. However, after the Revolutionary War, many
American states repealed English statutes and rejected traditional English
structures.1 9 As a result, the accepted legal form in many states in early
America for charitable activities became the corporation. Most states
encouraged the incorporation of private associations that engaged in
essential public services.' Therefore, when the first federal income tax on
corporations was adopted in America in 1894, it exempted from income
taxation those
corporations, companies, or associations organized and
conducted solely for charitable, religious or educational
purposes,... nor to the stocks, shares, funds, or securities
held by any fiduciary21or trustee for charitable, religious, or
educational purposes.
Because American public charitable entities continued to be formed
primarily as corporations rather than as trusts, subsequent income tax acts,
such as the Revenue Act of 1913, contained similar provisions.22 However,
early legislative history gave
23 scant information on what legislators
considered to be "charitable."

the State.
18. See UL
19. Some of the American states rejected English laws en masse, among them the Statute of
Charitable Uses. See id. at 1919. Some of the states also rejected the charitable trust as the legal
form for operating charitable activities. See id.
However, corporations had been formed to conduct charitable activities in the American
colonies as early as the seventeenth century. See James J. Fishman, The Development ofNonprofit
CorporationLaw and an Agendafor Reform, 34 EMORY L. J. 617, 630 (1985).
20. RONALD SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OFTHE AMERICAN BusINEsS CoRPORAnoN 1784-1855,
at 255 (1982); Fishman, supra note 19, at 631-37.
21. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32,28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894).
22. See supra note 4 (discussing statutory history of income tax exemption); see also infra
notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing whether I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) term "charitable" was
intended to be synonymous with term "charity" for trust law purposes).
23. The first lengthy consideration of the term "charitable" by legislators occurred in 1924
in the Senate, when, during debate, Senator Willis of Ohio informed his fellow Senators that the
Bureau of Internal Revenue ("Bureau"), predecessor to the IRS, used the term to include only
organizations with activities limited to aiding the poor. See 65 CONG. REC. 8171(1924). Senator
Willis considered the Bureau's definition too narrow and sought to expand the statute (which for
all intents and purposes was identical to the current statute) to parenthetically define "charitable"
to include organizations that provide "preventive and constructive service for relief, rehabilitation,
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Today, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), the federal statute that grants exemption
from income taxation to charitable organizations, reads much like its
predecessor provisions. It specifically inflicts a "purpose constraint" that
is, the organization must be "organized and operated exclusively for
' but utilizes
religious, charitable, scientific.., or educational purposes,"24
the term "charitable" without presenting a formal definition. Although the
past thirty-five years have resulted in much effort to clarify the meaning of
"charitable" by legislators, 25 the I.R.S.,26 the judiciary,27 commentators, 8

health, character building and citizenship." Id. Some senators objected to the addition of the
parenthetical phrase because of its potential expansiveness and its effect of making such
organizationsperse"charitable" and thus automatically tax-exempt regardless of services provided
to the poor. See id. at 8171-72. Senator Smoot, in particular, argued against Senator Willis'
proposal because of its use of vague terms like "health" and "character building." Id. at 8172. The
debate resulted in Senator Willis withdrawing his proposed statutory amendment. For further
discussion of this legislative endeavor, see Marilyn G. Rose, The Internal Revenue Service's
"Contribution" to the Health Problemsof the Poor,21 CATH. U. L. REV. 35, 46-51 (1971).
24. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1998). This section applies only to
[c]orporations. ... or foundation[s], no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation .... and which does not participate in, or intervene in... any political
campaign on behalf of... any candidate for public office.
Id. Along with the term "charitable," this provision lists religious, scientific and educational
purposes which are considered to be acceptable charitable activities for exemption. See id. §
501(c)(4)-(27).
25. A recent example of legislators' involvement in addressing the meaning of "charitable"
was in the context of whether hospitals are per se charitable organizations for purposes of §
501(c)(3). In 1969, the American Hospital Association (AHA) suggested in hearings before the
House Ways and Means Committee that nonprofit hospitals should be per se tax-exempt
organizations. See Hearingson TaxReformAct of 1969, H.R. 13270, Before the House Comm. On
Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1425, 1432-33 (1969) (statement by AHA attorney Julius M.
Greisman). The House granted the AHA request in its report. See H.R. CONw. REP. No. 91-413, at
43 (1969). The Senate Finance Committee deleted the House provision granting per se exemption
to hospitals, which thejoint committee accepted. See S. REP. No. 91-552, at 61 (1969); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 91-782, at 289-90 (1969). However, as the Senate Finance Committee promised, the
matter was again considered in connection with Medicare and Medicaid legislation. See Medicare
and Medicaid: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Medicare-Medicaidof the Senate Comm. On
Finance,91st Cong., 374-76 (1970); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID-PROBLEMS, ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 55-58 (Comm. Print 1970).
The issue has surfaced more recently. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Part1II: HearingsBefore
the Senate Comm. on Finance.99th Cong., 29-30 (1986) (statement of Bernard R. Tresnowski,
President, Blue Cross and Blue Shield Organization, Chicago, I1., in which Mr. Tresnowski voiced
objections to repeal of the Federal tax exemption for Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans). Most
recently, in hearings involving the proposed Health Security Act, S. 1757, 103d Cong., (1993), the
Joint Committee on Taxation examined the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals in the context of
their role in furthering charitable purposes. See STAFFOFJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103d CONG.,
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and the Department of Treasury,29 there has resulted no fixed definition of
the word "charitable." Rather, as set forth in Treasury regulations, the term
is to be broadly applied in "its generally accepted legal sense."30

DESCRIPTIONANDANALYSIS OFTITLE VII OFH.R. 3600,S. 1757, AND S. 1775 ("HEALTH SECURITY

ACT") 82-84 (Comm. Print 1993). The committee recognized that a nonprofit medical care
organization, in order to qualify for tax exemption, "must demonstrate that its activities are targeted
to a charitable class." Id. at 82. The Committee further noted that "[t]he precise nature of that
charitable class has been and continues to be a source of controversy." Id.
26. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202; Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
27. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,585-89 (1983); Girard Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108,109-10 (3d Cir. 1941); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150,
1157-59 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub. nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Sound Health
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 177-78 (1978).
28. See, e.g., MARIONR. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 41-43 (1965);
BRUCE

R. HOPKINS,

THE LAW OF TX-EXEMPT ORGANIzATIoNS 123-76 (6th ed. 1992); Boris I.

Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALEL.J. 299,330-33 (1976); Houck, supranote 11, at 1424-25; Persons et al., supra
note 4, at 1932-50.
29. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, Edwin S. Cohen, stated in hearings
before the House Ways and Means Committee: "We have tried to avoid interpreting the word
'charitable' in a fixed, immutable fashion. As the courts have done in many nontax settings, we
have tried to give it meaning that changes and expands as the needs of society change and expand."
HOUSE COMMrIrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 92ND CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE AcrnvrrY BY
CERTAIN TYPES OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 5 (Comm. Print 1972).

30. Treas. Reg. § 1.503-(d)(2) (as amended, 1990). Early Treasury pronouncements
consistently had interpreted the term "charitable" in its "popular and ordinary" sense, see HOPKINS,
supra note 28, at 75 n.31-32; I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923); Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517
(interpreting provision underRevenueAct of 1924); Treas. Reg. 69, art. 517 (interpreting provision
under Revenue Act of 1926); Treas. Reg. 74, art. 527 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act
of 1928); Treas. Reg. 77, art. 527 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act of 1932); Treas. Reg.
86, art. 101 (6)-1 (interpreting provision under Revenue Act of 1934); Treas. Reg. 94, art. 101 (6)-1
(interpreting provision under Revenue Act of 1936); Treas. Reg. 101, art. 101(6)-1 (interpreting
provision under Revenue Act of 1938); Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt OrganizationAdvocacy:
Matching the Rules to the Rationales,63 IND. L.J. 201, 257 & n.240 (1987); see also Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 336-37 (D.D.C. 1973) (stating that Congress
intended the term "charitable" to be interpreted in its narrow sense). However, by 1959, Treasury
had changed its approach to reflect a broader interpretation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (d)(2)
(1959), which in relevant part provided:
The term "charitable" is used in section 501 (c)(3) in its generally accepted legal
sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration
in section 501 (c)(3) ofother tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad
outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions. Such term includes: relief
of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion;
advancement ofeducation or science; erection or maintenance ofpublic buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Government; and promotion of
social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish any of the above purposes,
or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to
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I. SCHOLARS' THEORIES OFTAX EXEMPTION FOR
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

A. Basic Notions
Putting aside the weight and potency of history, scholars have stressed
explanatory theories based on economic, social and public policy
reasoning. Several authors have relied on considerations of the importance
of nonprofit organizations in promoting pluralism in American society."
Another explanation is that the nonprofit sector provides a means by which
collaborative actions of persons in our individualistic democratic society
can freely express a solidarity of values and goals.32 Some commentators
explain that the exemption resides in the concept that charitable
organizations serve important moral and social functions deserving of
support.33
B. Subsidy Theory
A conventional combined market and social theory, the "subsidy
theory," is based upon the notion that charitable organizations relieve the
government of burdens by providing essential goods and services that the
government otherwise would be responsible for delivering.34 The theory is

combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
Although the regulations were amended in 1990, they employ the same descriptive language of
using the term "charitable" in its "generally accepted legal sense." See Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)1(d)(2) (as amended in 1990).
The Supreme Court has infused the concept of "charitable" with an obligation to comport with
public policy. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1983) (holding that a
university is not charitable if it is racially discriminatory).
31. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 10; Norman S. Fink, Taxation andPhilanthropy-A
1976 Perspective,3 J.C. & U.L., Fall 1975, at 1. Courts also have cited pluralism as a rationale for
the tax exemption. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.D.C.), affid sub nom.,
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
32. See HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 11-16.
33. See, e.g., James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisionsof Subchapter F, 29 TAX LAW.
523,526 (1976). This moralistic policy also has been cited as underlying the I.R.C. § 170 charitable
contribution deduction. See William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductionsin anIdeal Income Tax, 86
HARv. L. REv. 309,346 (1972).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (3d Sess. 1938), which indicated that
[t]he exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and
other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have
to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from
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premised on the notion that charitable purposes and organizations are
worthy of promotion, and it is the government that should promote them
through an indirect subsidy-the tax exemption.35
Critics have perceived the subsidy theory to be an incomplete
explanation for the exemption. 36 The tax exemption has been equated to an
indirect government subsidy that amounts to a tax expenditure, the
efficiency of which is questionable in comparison with efficiencies
perceived to attach to direct subsidies. 37 Finally, the subsidy theory has not
been regarded as universally applicable to all nonprofit organizations.38
C. Alternatives to Subsidy Theory
Scholars have proposed a number of alternative theories in response to
criticisms of the subsidy theory. There are basically four alternative
theories posited by academians: (1) the income measurement theory; (2)
the capital formation theory; (3) the "altruism theory;" and (4)the donative
the promotion of the general welfare.
SeealsoMcGlottenv. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448,456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Mhe Government relieves
itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the absence of charitable activity would fall
on the shoulders of the Government.").
35. For example, the theory provides that charitable organizations deliver "charity," which
includes health care services to the poor free of charge because, in part, the provision of such
services is recognized as a community benefit under traditional trust law, and it relieves the
government of the burden of providing such services. See Bromberg, supra note 12, at 248-51;
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307, 332-38 (1991). These are the same
factors used by the IRS and courts in determining whether an organization deserves tax-exempt
status as a"charitable" organization. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501-(c)(3) and cases cited supranote
27.
36. See, eg., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 28, at 305-06; Developments in the
Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1620-21 (1992) [hereinafter
Developmentsin the Law] (explaining subsidy theory, scrutinizing its shortcomings, and suggesting
a tax expenditure analysis revealing its weaknesses).
37. See Developments in the Law, supra note 36, at 1620. A critic of the subsidy theory
suggests that:
[E] mbedding substantive policy programs in the tax system forces ill-equipped tax
administrators and legislative tax committees to make substantive policy decisions.
Congressional spending eludes proper scrutiny by substantive policy committees
whenever Congress includes such spending programs in tax legislation. Similarly,
this practice forces the IRS to make substantive policy decisions when formulating
regulations that interpret legislation.
Id. at 1621 (footnotes omitted); see also STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANiEL, TAX
EXPENDrrURES 95-96, 106 (1985) (discussing administrative burdens of implementing substantive
income tax policies).
38. See supra note 37.
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theory.
1. Income Measurement Theory
The "income measurement theory," proposed in 1976 by two tax
scholars, Professors Boris I. Bittker and George K. Rahdert, suggests that
nonprofit organizations are exempt from income taxation because there is
no practical and traditional tax accounting method to measure the net
income of the entities.39 In other words, it is difficult for a nonprofit entity
to classify certain income, such as donations, and to categorize certain
expenses that could be typed as either nondeductible, or deductible as
4
ordinary and necessary business expenses to a for-profit enterprise. 0
Further, even if the net income of the charities were definable and thus
determinable, there is no means of setting the proper tax rates under
current tax theory.41 However, the income measurement theory has not
been favored by other academicians on the grounds that it is inapplicable
to many nonprofit organizations because donations comprise only a portion
of their financial resources, while measurable income often is derived from
sales of goods or services.4'
2. Capital Formation Theory and the Nondistribution Constraint
The "capital formation theory" was constructed by economist and law
professor Henry Hansmann in response to perceived inadequacies of the
income measurement theory.43 In his theory, Professor Hansmann suggests
that the income tax exemption is appropriate for nonprofit organizations
because it compensates them for inadequate access to the traditional form
ofcapital-equity investment.44 He explains that lacking borrowed capital,
donated capital, or retained earnings, nonprofit organizations are unable to
expand and are unlikely to reach their optimal size.4' Therefore, Professor
Hannsman asserts that the tax exemption is an effective way to offset this
disadvantage because it permits nonprofits to retain more net earnings for
expansion and innovation.46

39. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 28, at 301-07.
40. See id. at 307-14.
41. See id. at 314-16.
42. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 610-16
(1990); Hall & Colombo, supranote 35, at 385-87; Henry Hansmann, TheRationaleforExempting
Nonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58-62 (1981).
43. See Hansmann, supra note 42, at 55.
44. See id. at 72-75 (arguing that the tax exemption levels the playing field of for-profit
enterprises and nonprofit organizations with regard to capital acquisition).
45. See id. at 72-74.
46. See id. at 72-75 (stating that loss of the tax exemption would result in a lessened ability
of nonprofit organizations to be technologically current).
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Professor Hansmann premised his capital formation theory on the
"nondistribution constraint."'47 The nondistribution constraint is based on
the historical rule that forbids a charity from distributing surplus funds to
persons other than the intended class of charitable beneficiaries.48 There is
aprohibition against distributing surplusage to persons having control over
the charitable organization, such as owners, donors, managers, or trustees
of a charitable organization.49 Consequently, Professor Hansmann argues
that nonprofit organizations are the most efficient providers of goods and
services as a result of "contract failures"--that is, information asymmetries
and monitoring problems-that occur within the framework of for-profit
enterprises because, in the private marketplace, consumers of for-profit
businesses either may not have ready access to information or may have
difficulty evaluating for-profit goods and service providers.' In other
47. See id. at 56-57.
48. See Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (1601) (Eng.), which was the first attempt
to enforce this common law rule.
49. Professor Hansmann describes the nondistribution constraint by stating:
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred from
distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it,
such as members, officers, directors, or trustees. By "net earnings" I mean here
pure profits-that is, earnings in excess of the amount needed to pay for services
rendered to the organization; in general, a nonprofit is free to pay reasonable
compensation to any person for labor or capital that he provides, whether or not
that person exercises some control over the organization. It should be noted that
a nonprofit organization is not barred from earning a profit.... It is only the
distribution of the profits that is prohibited.
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE LJ. 835, 838 (1980).
50. See Hansmann, supra note 42, at 86-91; Hansmann, supra note 49, at 843-45. The
contract failures to which Professor Hansmann refers are types of transaction costs to which
economist R. H. Coase wrote of in 1937. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA,
(Nov. 1937), at 4, reprintedin THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 33, 38-40 (1988).
Professor Hansmann describes three situations in which public consumers or patrons of an
organization would prefer a nonprofit form over a for-profit form because of information
asymmetries: (1) third-party payors, like persons making donations to the American Red Cross for
disaster relief; (2) public goods, like public monuments or scientific research; and (3) complex
personal services, like hospital care or education. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
CorporationLaw, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504-6 (1981). The information asymmetry in the first
category, due to such factors as physical distance from the disaster and lack of tracing of funds,
means the third-party payor cannot judge whether donated funds are actually spent on disaster
relief. See id.at 505. In the second situation, a potential patron may consider not making a donation
to a for-profit provider of the public good because of both the ability to be a free-rider, and the lack
of ability to monitor whether donations actually are spent on the provision of the public good. See
id. at 505-06. In the final category, the consumer of complex personal services, such as health care
or education, may lack expertise to determine the quality and appropriateness of the type of health
care or education. See id. at 506. Professor Hansmann suggests that the nondistribution constraint
solves these information asymmetries. See id. He asserts that because nonprofits are prohibited from
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words, he suggests that the income tax exemption may encourage the
development and growth of nonprofit organizations in industries
characterized by information asymmetries and monitoring problems. This
is so because consumers trust nonprofit organizations (due to the
nondistribution constraint) more than they trust for-profit entities that are
in business to make and distribute their profits to shareholders."
For years, academicians have criticized Professor Hansmann' s theories
for numerous reasons, among which are its restricted application to
economically efficient nonprofits, a lack of historical consistency, a
deficiency in strong supportive evidence, the absence of consideration of
concepts like philanthropy and charity, and the treatment of all
consumers-patrons, customers, and donors-as alike.52 Recently, one
scholar, Professor Evelyn Brody, argued that the nondistribution constraint
theory is circular.53 Under the nondistribution constraint theory, as a result
of the public's lack of information, it cannotjudge the quality of goods and
services in the marketplace by for-profit enterprises; in response, the public
forms nonprofit organizations which are deemed trustworthy, regardless
of merit or public accountability. 54 Relying on the nondistribution
constraint theory as her focal point, she questioned whether the public can
discern the trustworthiness of nonprofits, where there is little public
accountability, any better than it can determine the trustworthiness of forprofit organizations.55 She argued that if trustworthiness cannot be better
discerned with respect to nonprofits, the nondistribution constraint cannot
be the reason for having nonprofit providers of goods and services in the
marketplace .56 Moreover, if one cannot distinguish nonprofit and for-profit
organizations by their trustworthiness, then the nondistribution constraint
cannot explain nonprofits' entitlement to the tax exemption.57

distributing funds to persons for personal gain and mustuse funds to support intended beneficiaries,
patrons link a sense of security or trustworthiness to nonprofit providers and prefer them in these
situations to for-profit providers. See id.
51. See Hansmann,supranote 50, at 506-07. However, Professor Hansmann admits that such
contract failure assumptions do not apply in the case of most hospital services because physicians
assist patient-consumers in making health care service decisions. See Hansmann, supranote 49, at
866-68; Hansmann, supra note 42, at 89.
52. See Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory ofNonprofit Corporations,80 MICH. L. REV.

999, 1000, 1013-18 (1982); Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 387-89.
53. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457,459 (1996).
54. See id. at 459-60.
55. See id. at 460,462-65.
56. See id. at 460.
57. See id. at 535-36. Professor Brody reminds us that the economic account is only one
aspect of considering whether nonprofit organizations warrant tax exemption. See id. at 536.
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3. Altruism Theory
Despite their shortcomings, Professor Hansmann's theories, as well as
the subsidy theory, have served as a foundation on which others have built.
Professor Rob Atkinson developed an "altruism theory,"' 8 which takes a
social policy approach that "rests on the premise that the favorable tax
treatment of altruistic nonprofit organizations demonstrates an affirmative
preference for something" that those entities provide, including both direct
primary benefits to consumers and "metabenefits." 9
He posits that public charities generate collective goods and services
that benefit the public and are deemed inherently good-for example,
social services to the needy, education, and health care.6 Beyond these
specific and direct benefits, charitable organizations generate other
benefits: "metabenefits. ' 61 Metabenefits are "benefits that derive not from
what product is produced or to whom it is distributed, but rather from how
it is produced or distributed."'6 2 Metabenefits, which are considered
intrinsically good, include such intangibles as the fostering ofvolunteerism
and pluralism, "initiative of thought and action," experimentation, and the
like.63 Professor Atkinson suggests that altruism is an inherently valuable
metabenefit produced by nonprofits and that it deserves tax subsidization.'
He indicates that alternatives to tax subsidization may not be less costly,
and that by virtue of its duration and structure, the established tax
subsidization system enjoys considerable legitimacy.6'
4. Donative Theory
Criticizing the traditional theories and refining and expanding other
theories, Professors Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo developed the
"donative theory," which posits that only those charitable organizations
funded substantially by philanthropic donations deserve and should be

58. Atkinson, supra note 42, at 618.
59. Id.
60. See iU at 605.
61. Id. (describing traditional subsidy theory as encompassing the provision of conventional
goods and services beneficial to the public by altruistic nonprofit organizations, which also produce
"metabenefits," meaning they have the capacity to deliver such goods or services "more efficiently,
more innovatively, or otherwise better than other suppliers").
62. Id.

63. See id. at 605 & n.291
64. See id. at 628-29.
65. See id. at 632; see also James Andreoni, Giving with ImpureAltruism: Applications to
Charityand RicardianEquivalence,97 J. POL. EcON. 1447, at 1448-49 (1989) (concluding that
people derive some utility and "warm glow" from the act of contributing, which makes government

subsidies imperfect substitutes for gifts).
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entitled to the tax exemption.6 Their arguments draw on economics
"strongly buttressed by the leading theories of distributive justice and by
the pluralistic values that characterize the third [nonprofit] sector."'67 The
donative theory suggests "that the primary rationale for the charitable
exemption is to subsidize those organizations capable of attracting a
substantial level of donative support from the public"---that is, donative
nonprofits."
Specifically, Professors Hall and Colombo assert as direct corollaries
the following: (1) the fact that an entity can attract a substantial level of
donations demonstrates its worthiness of and need for donations-hence,
deservedness, 69 and, (2) the entity's deservedness is demonstrated by the
"willingness of the public to contribute" to it.7' They maintain that
neither the particular market defect that leads to a donation
nor the subjective motivation for a donation is relevant to
whether the object of a donation qualifies for subsidy (at
most, only to the level of subsidy); all that matters is whether
a payment is71in fact a donation, which is revealed by a quid
pro quo test.
They also reason that because the donative theory is not based on classic
economics, it answers the question of why the exemption is a response to
the market failure that results in free-rider problems and the government's
inability to provide all necessary services or goods at their optimal levels.72

66. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1383-84 (1991); Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 389-90.
67. Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 1389.
68. Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 390. The theory fits donative nonprofits better than
commercial nonprofits, which, because they generate income from other sources, do not rely on
contributions to the same extent as donative nonprofits. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at
1389-90. Professors Hall and Colombo assert that the donative theory has a "unique ability to tie
together all of the major components of the taxation of charities. It explains the deduction for
charitable contributions, the income tax exemption, and the property tax exemption." Id. at 1433.
They also state that it "nicely explains" the sales tax exemption. Id. at 1433 n.152.
69. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 1384-85.
70. Id. at 1385.
71. Id. at 1389.
72. See id. at 1391-92; Hall & Colombo, supranote 35, at 391-94. Hall and Colombo suggest
that "classic economic theory"
postulates that the government is in the best position to provide public goods
(eitherdirectly, orby subsidizing private production) since government can coerce
purchase by everyone via the power of taxation.
Sometimes, however, the government fails.., to supply the optimal level of
a public good. The consequence of this twin failure of markets and government
is that people resort to volunteerism to provide unmet public needs.... [F]ree-
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Moreover, Professors Hall and Colombo suggest that where market
defects give rise to significant donations, "the existence of substantial
donative support from the public at large signals the need for an
additional... subsidy."7 3 The tax exemption is appropriate "to take up the
donative slack 7 4 because the free-rider phenomenon intrudes, causing
charitable donations alone to systematically fall short of supplying
sufficient funds to make an organization financially able to optimally
deliver all public needs.75 In other words, all charitable organizations will
be underfunded by donations alone, and the tax exemption fills the funding
gap with a shadow subsidy. However, in applying their theory, Professors
Hall and Colombo suggest that because only those nonprofit entities that
attract "substantial" donations should receive the tax exemption, the
entities should attain a threshold donation level of approximately thirtythree percent of gross revenue before qualifying.76 Thus, Professors Hall
and Colombo indicate the nondeservedness of commercial nonprofits that
supply complex goods and services to a substantial number of consumers
for a fee.
To date, I have located two published criticisms of the donative
theory.77 While labeled "promising" because the theory seeks to explain
both the income tax and property tax exemption, it is criticized for its
"inherent arbitrariness in setting the threshold level of donations necessary

riding behavior is severely dampened by a set of motives loosely described as
altruism-a willingness to take a collective view of social benefit and set aside
narrow, individual self-interest. Donative nonprofits exist as the preferred
organizational form when an institutional setting is required for altruism.
The observed willingness to donate conflicts with classic economics only in
its most absolute form, though, by disproving the strong free rider hypothesis.
That is, the willingness to donate conflicts with the classic economic theory that
rational people will always choose to free ride....
The persistence of the free rider disinclination to support societal or group
causes supplies the most rigorous justification for subsidizing the objects of
altruism .... The free riding incentive tells us, however, that these donations
systematically fall short of supplying the objects of philanthropy at an optimally
desired level, that is, the level that would be supplied if the products or services
were capable of being purchased (or did not suffer from government failure). A
tax exemption for donative institutions helps to take up this donative slack by
using the tax system as a form of shadow subsidy.
Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 1391-93 (footnotes omitted).
73. Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 1385.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1398.
76. See id. at 1450-58 (with respect to nonprofit hospitals).
77. See Rob Atkinson, Theoriesofthe FederalIncome Tax Exemptionfor Charities:Thesis,
Antithesis,and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395,428 (1997); Developments in the Law, supra
note 36, at 1623-25.
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to qualify for tax-exempt status" and its view that intensity of true public
support for an institution is not necessarily reflected by the amount of
donations.7 8 Professor Rob Atkinson points out that the donative theory
produces a paradox, and this point is admitted by Professors Hall and
Colombo:
The more donative support an organization receives, and thus
the more deserving it is of subsidy in terms of the likely
undersupply of the good it produces, the greater will be its
ratio of donative to other income and hence the less helpful
the subsidy will be. Why less helpful? Because gifts are not
ordinarily included in income anyway, and even if they were,
they could be offset by an operating expense deduction if they
were disbursed."
I would suggest that the donative theory is in its own way circular. The
theory is based upon worthiness or deservedness. Pursuant to the theory,
the tax exemption is conferred on charitable organizations that receive
donations; donations are received by "deserving" organizations. Therefore,
conferral of the tax exemption is appropriate for those organizations
supported by substantial donations. The theory fails to consider a number
of issues. What is the connection, if any, between deservedness of the tax
exemption and the level of donations an organization is able to attract?
What if an existing nonprofit does not attract "substantial" donations? Are
its activities necessarily not worthy of governmental support in the form
of a tax exemption? Is it really not supported in a nonfinancial sense by the
public? Does the failure to attract substantial donations truly mean that
donors are capable of monitoring charitable organizations and that their
levels of donations directly correlate with and are true indicators of the
trustworthiness of nonprofits to provide quality goods and services
otherwise unavailable at optimal levels due to market failure and contract
failure? What about a "start-up" nonprofit organization that has yet to
attract large amounts of donations because it is new to the marketplace?
Does a system of permitting exemption on a trial basis for a two or five
year period, as suggested by Professors Hall and Colombo, inhibit rather
than encourage new entrants to the nonprofit marketplace, and hence
potentially restrict the availability of certain public goods and services?
Because charitable nonprofits are said to provide a valued means of
expanding volunteerism, of promoting pluralism, of fostering innovation,
and of supporting other "metabenefits," does the theory devalue the
importance that society has placed on them? In sum, does the donative

78. Developments in the Law, supra note 36, at 1624-25.
79. Atkinson, supra note 64, at 428.
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theory merely indicate which charitable organizations its proponents think
deserve to receive a tax subsidy?
D. Summary
In summary, a number of scholars have valiantly attempted to explain
the rationale behind the federal income tax exemption for charitable
organizations. Many of the theories discussed herein have provided
building blocks or foundations for more recent rationales. However, no
proffered explanation has yet extended a full and satisfactory explanation
that can be universally applied and has been widely accepted.

111. PROPOSAL: RISK COMPENSATION THEORY
A basic assumption of any theory proposed to explain why charitable
organizations deserve an income tax exemption is the notion that the
nonprofit sector is an alternative to both the private sector and government.
In other words, charitable organizations exist as an alternative to
proprietary firms and to entities that are wholly supported by government
("public entities"). For example, in the health care industry, we find not
only proprietary hospitals and public hospitals entirely supported by local,
state or federal funds, but also nonprofit hospitals, such as academic
hospitals, that are supported directly and indirectly by the government and
receive private donations.8' Thus, there are two questions to be asked:
First, why do charitable organizations arise in addition to for-profit finns
and public entities? And second, what makes the nonprofit organizations
sufficiently different from proprietary entities to warrant the income tax
exemption, both initially and over time?
As with some of the more recently expressed rationales for the income
tax exemption for charitable organizations, my risk compensation theory
utilizes as a foundation the combined theory of market and government
failure: nonprofit organizations arise where the private and government
sectors of society fail to adequately supply desired goods and services. The
question is, "why are public and private supply inadequate?"

80. For a general discussion of these institutions, see CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF
STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPrrAL SYSTEM (1987) (presenting a historical overview
of American hospitals); PAULSTARR, THE SOCIALTRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN MEDICINE 145232 (1982) (examining the emergence of the modem hospital). See Crimm, supranote 3, at 11-15
(discussing the growth of non-profit hospitals); Nina J. Crimm, Tax Plansfor the Twenty-First
Century: Medical Incentive Vouchers Address the Needs of Academic Health Centers and the
Elderly, 71 TuL. L. REV. 653, 656 n.8 (1997) (discussing proprietory and nonprofit institutions).
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A. Background
1. Market Failure and Government Failure
A basic microeconomic explanation for the existence of charitable
organizations is their ability to facilitate the production and availability of
public goods and services at a level not otherwise provided in the
marketplace.
As a starting point, public or collective goods and services can be
divided into two categories: pure public goods and services and impure, or
mixed, public goods and services. Both categories are characterized by
features of availability to an indefinite class of beneficiaries, and of the
inability to force the public to directly pay a sufficient price to induce the
production in the private marketplace. 8 Pure public goods and services are
characterized by nonrivalry-that is, "one person's consumption of the
good does not interfere with its availability to others"--and by
nonexcludability-that is, no person can be excluded from consumption
83
of the good or service even if unwilling to pay for it (a "free-rider").
However, if the definition of public goods and services were stretched to
include some goods and services that do not encompass both
characteristics of total nonrivalry and nonexclusivity, then it is "sufficient
that the cost of excluding an individual is greater than the marginal cost of
supplying the good [or service] to her as an additional user. It is cheaper
to supply the good freely than to charge each user for it."' Thus, a forprofit firm would not have an incentive to undertake the production of a
81. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 457-58 (4th ed.

1982).
82. Mark P. Gergen, The Casefor a CharitableContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393, 1397 (1988).
83. See JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL MICROECONOMICS FOR PUBLIC POuCY ANALYSIS 83
(1995); MANSFIELD, supra note 81, at 467; RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,

PUBLIC FINANCE INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 53-54 (1973); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 16 (1965); Gergen, supra note 82. Nonexcludability indicates that if a
nonpayor, or "free-rider," cannot be excluded from consumption, the private market for its
provision cannot be created. The concept ofnonrivalry, MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supraat 5354, is based on efficiency. See id. at 53. If the good or service is absolutely nonrival in
character, then efficiency would require that every consumer having any utility for the good or
service would be allowed use of it. In other words, the marginal cost of allowing anoher person
to use the good or service is zero, and because price equals marginal cost, then the efficient price
for a truly nonrival good or service is zero. However, in the rational private marketplace, a
provider would not provide a good for the price of zero. For an in-depth discussion, see LEVY,
supra, at 81.
84. Gergen, supra note 82, at 1397. In other words, optimal output for a pure public good is
achieved when "marginal social benefit equals marginal social cost." MANSFIELD, supra note 8 1,
at 468. Nonrivalry is a weaker requirement than nonexclusivity. See LEVY, supra note 83, at 83;
see also supra note 83.
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pure public good or service. For example, a for-profit firm may not
financially be able to undertake basic scientific research. If it were to enter
into a research project, it could not hope to secure the full value of the
output of its research because many persons and organizations could
benefit from the research in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons,
and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to charge all such gainers."
The second type of public goods and services can be labeled mixed or
impure public goods and services. Mixed public goods and services
indirectly benefit the public, but provide direct benefits to special groups
of people. 6 For example, the existence of a museum in a community
should make the community a more appealing and exciting place for all
persons to live and will directly benefit those persons who utilize the
facility by providing them with access to art they otherwise would not
have. An urban renewal program in which slum housing is replaced with
attractive low-cost housing directly benefits the residents and indirectly
benefits the public by providing more aesthetically pleasing and potentially
safer neighborhoods. Thus, any mixed public good or service theoretically

85. See MANSFIELD, supra note 81, at 454. Mansfield explains that because of such external
economies as the fact that some fundamental discoveries are not patentable and can be utilized by
other producersthere is likely to be a divergence between the private and social benefits from
basic research, with the result that a perfectly competitive economy would be
expected to devote fewer resources to basic research than is socially optimal.
Consequently, there seems to be a good case on purely economic grounds for the
government (or some other agency not motivated by profit) to support basic
research. As stated in the [National Academy of Sciences'] report, [sic]
There is good theoretical reason for expecting that, left to itself, the
market would not only tend to allocate too few resources to research in
general, but would also tend to bias the allocation against basic scientific
research.... These defects of the market mechanism with respect to the
allocation of resources toward and among investments in research imply
that the market needs to be supplemented, and perhaps, with respect to
basic scientific research, entirely replaced by social provision and
allocation of resources for the support of scientific research.
Id. at 454 (quoting NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BASIC RESEARCH AND NATIONAL GOALS,
REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 136 (WASHINGTON, D.C.: U.S. GOVERNMENTPRINTGOFFICE, 1965)). Professor

Mansfield estimated that the private annual rate of return on investment in corporate research was
only 50% of the "social" rate of return (including benefits to others). See Peter Passell, The Tax
Creditfor Research and Development: Free Lunch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at D2. Therefore,
"[left on their own, then, corporations have an incentive to invest less on research and development
than is desirable from the perspective of the economy as a whole." Id.
86. See GARYFROMM &PAULTAUBMAN, PUBLICECONOMICTHEORY AND POLICY 25 (1973);

see also Gergen, supra note 82.
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can be bifurcated into a private portion and a public portion. 7 The
bifurcation of a mixed public good or service may be fairly simple on an
abstract level, but difficult when it comes to measuring the value of each
portion.
2. Market and Governmental Mechanisms
The market mechanism for public goods and services does not work
properly because external economies make it worthwhile for rational
consumers to be free-riders." To correct for the free-rider problem, a
nonmarket mechanism is needed. 9 One such mechanism is the
government. However, the government is also inherently limited in its
ability to correct for market failure, even when the majority of citizens
support the governmental endeavor.' ° The government is limited by such
problems as its own cumbersome and inefficient bureaucratic structure,
resistance of the populace to governmental intrusions, and the like. Hence,
it has been posited that the nonprofit sector arises to fill the gap.9

87. Economists formulate that under pure competition, the marginal cost of a mixed good or
service is equal to the sum all persons will pay for it in private and in public use. See FROMM &
TAUBMAN, supra note 86.
88. The concept of external economies has been described by economists as elusive. Yet, as
a general idea,
[i]t is agreed that they mean services (and disservices) rendered free (without
compensation) by one producer to another, but there is no agreement on the nature
and form of these services or on the reasons for their being free. It is also agreed
that external economies are a cause for divergence between private profit and
social benefit and thus for the failure of perfect competition to lead to an optimum
situation; but for this there are many reasons, and it is nowhere made clear how
many and which of these reasons are subsumed under the heading of "external
economies."
Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, in EXTERNALITIES: THEORETICAL
DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 77, 77 (Robert Staff & Francis Tannian eds., 1973). With
respect to the provision of public goods, externalities (nonappropriable benefits or noncollectible
costs) cause market inefficiencies. Market failure occurs with respect to the provision of public
goods and they are not produced at the optimum socially efficient level. With respect to pure public
goods, rational consumers (free-riders) are unwilling to pay for consumption of the goods because
such goods are available even to those who refuse payment. See MANSFIELD, supra note 81, at 458,
467; LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 7-9 (1992); see also supra
note 83 and accompanying text (discussing pure public goods and the free rider effect); see
generally Scitovsky, supra (examining external economies).
89. See MANSFIELD, supra note 81, at 467.
90. See id. See generally MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 83, at 83-105 (considering
the effect of politics on budget decisions).
91. For good discussions of this public goods theory of the existence of nonprofit
organizations, see BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 59-60 (1988); BURTON A.
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Although this economic analysis is straightforward, the economic literature
indicates more is needed.9
3. The Concept of Risk
The concept of risk is somewhat abstract. Dictionaries define risk as the
"chance of' 93 or "exposure to the chance"'94 of injury or loss; secondarily
each definition reflects that the concept of insurance covers the "degree of
probability of loss."'95 Not all economists agree on the definition of risk,
but a common thread involves the uncertainty or variation in possible
outcomes that results from a particular course of action.'
a. Pure, Speculative, Systematic and Diversifiable Risks
(1) Definitions
Scholars have refined this broad definition of risk by distinguishing
among pure, speculative, systematic and diversifiable risks. 7 Pure risk is
risk for which there is only a downside, that is, a potential for loss.98
Speculative risk is that risk which involves the possibility of some degree
of either gain or loss.99 Systematic risk is risk that cannot be eliminated by
diversification within a specific market or industry by a particular provider
of goods or services; all providers in the specific market or industry face
the same volatilities or variabilities. " Comparatively, diversifiable risk is

WEISBROD, NoT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AS PROVIDERS OF COLLECTIVE GOODS IN THE

VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR 1-10 (1977); Gergen, supra note 82, at 1397-99; Hansmann,
supra note 49, at 848-49.
92. See, e.g., FROMM&TAUBMAN supranote 86, at 28-52 (discussing cost-benefit analysis);
MANSFIELD, supra note 81, at 468-72 (suggesting a cost-benefit analysis); Roland N. McKean, The
Nature of Cost-Benefit Analysis, reprintedin EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED
READINGS 344 (1975).
93. Webster's NewWorld Dictionary oftheAmerican Language (Second College ed., 1980).
94. RANDOM HOUSE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1962).
95. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 93; RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 94.
96. See, e.g., FROMM & TAUBMAN, supranote 86, at 304-17.
97. Scholars also have distinguished between risk about which probability estimates can be

made and those about which probability estimates are disputed or unknown and hence cannot be
made. See A. KOUTSOYIANNIS, NON-PRICE DECISIONS: THE FIRM INA MODERN CONTEXT 501-02
(1982); FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1964).

98. Theft and fire are examples of pure risks.
99. A typical-example of speculative risk, also known by the Greek letter beta, which
numerically describes risk in the stock market, for which investors encompass the risk of realizing
gains or losses associated with investment in any particular equity. Modem portfolio theory and the

capital asset pricing model account for and explain such risk in the pricing of and returns on
equities. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 227-50 (1996).
100. Seeid. at241.
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risk that results from factors peculiar to a particular provider of goods or
services in a market or industry; diversifiable risk can be reduced or
limited by actions taken by the specific provider.'0 1
The perfect market includes the provision of all goods and services,
including pure and mixed public goods and services.1w In that perfect
marketplace, total risk-that is, pure risk plus speculative risk-would
necessarily include societal needs and desires for public goods and
services.
(2) The Capital Asset Pricing Model
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM),0 3 utilized in portfolio theory,
breaks down total risk associated with investments in stocks into its two
components, systematic risk (also known as beta) and diversifiable risk, in
an attempt to explain stock and portfolio valuations for a perfect capital
market model." Its thesis is that because stocks can be combined in
portfolios to eliminate or diversify the risk associated with a particular
stock, it is the systematic risk for which an investor demands and is paid
a risk premium (or return from the market)."0

101. See id. at 242.
102. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing pure and impure public goods
and services).
103. William Sharpe, John Lintner and Fisher Black created the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). For a more detailed look at the CAPM, see DAVID B. HERTZ & HOwARD THOMAS, RISK
ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 194-206 (1983); KOUTSOYIANNIS, supra note 97, at 499-500;
PETER G. MOORE, THE BUSINESS OF RISK 85-86, 116-29 (1983); WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO
THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the
Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfoliosand CapitalBudgets, 47 REV. EC. & STAT. 13
(1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibriwn in a Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMEMRICA 768 (1966);
William F. Sharpe, CapitalAsset Prices:A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditionsof
Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); William F. Sharpe, Risk, MarketSensitivityandDiversification,28 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 74 (1972).
104. CAPM has been criticized as having limitations. For example, contrary to the real world,
it assumes perfectly efficient markets. Systematic risk for a riskless security should give a return
exactly equal to the risk-free rate (e.g., the rate of investing in certificates of deposit guaranteed by
the United States government), but, in the real world, this theory does not hold true. Economists
have found that some stocks are more sensitive to market trends than others and that high risk
stocks earn lower returns than predicted under CAPM and that low risk stocks earn higher returns
than predicted by CAPM. See Fischer, Black et al., The CapitalAsset Pricing Model: Some
EmpiricalTests, in STUDIES INTHE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79-81 (Michael C. Jensen ed.,
1972). Moreover, beta is not a good predictor ofthe future market because betas are estimates based
on historical information and therefore cannot be determined for the future with any precision.
Additionally, beta appears to be a poor short-term performer. Finally, beta does not account for a
number of important systematic elements of risk; thus, it is not an effective quantitative measure
of risk. For a fuller discussion of the various criticisms, see MALKIEL, supra note 99, at 256-74.
105. The return from the market is different from the rate of return. See MALKIEL, supranote
99, at 256. The rate of return equals the risk-free rate plus beta, which is the return from the market
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Systematic risk arises from the variability of stock values in general;
the risk of each stock in the market is correlated with the performance of
the market,"'° although the sensitivity of particular stocks to market
movement may vary. So, a stock's tendency to increase or decrease in
value has a positive correlation to the stock market's up and down
movements."°7 Systematic risk of a particular stock thus cannot be
eliminated by diversification."10
On the other hand, diversifiable risk of stock value is not correlated
with the stock market as a whole. " Rather, the return on a particular stock
may fluctuate because of a variety of factors not associated with changes
in the stock market's direction. 1 For example, the company may lose a
lucrative client, or it may obtain a profitable new contract.
Applying the CAPM to a portfolio of investments in stocks, variations
in the return from any one stock will be offset to some extent by variations
in the return of another stock."' It follows that holding a number of stocks12
will permit diversification, or an overall smoothing of diversifiable risks.1
Finally, because risk and return are related, the CAPM suggests that in a
perfect market, because the portfolio compensates for diversifiable risks,
returns on investments in a stock represent a risk premium for systematic
risk alone.1 3 Thus, as the systematic risk of an individual stock or portfolio
increases, so too will the risk premium or return. "4 In other words, in order
to induce an investor to purchase and hold a stock or a portfolio of stock
investments that are perceived as highly risky, the investor must be
compensated with high returns for the systematic risk accepted.
The CAPM has been criticized by some economists on a number of
grounds." 5 Criticisms are based in large part on the perception that beta
falls as an accurate measure of systematic risk because it is underinclusive
of all systematic elements of risk, and that the CAPM is a perfect market
model that is deficient in application to the real market." 6 However,
despite the fact that other theories of pricing in the capital markets have
been developed," 7 CAPM continues to be favored by many economists

minus the risk-free rate. See id.
106. See id. at 251-74.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 142.
111. Seeid. at 142-43.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 244; see also KOUTSOYIANNIS, supra note 97, at 500.
114. See MALKIEL, supra note 99, at 247.
115. See supra note 104.
116. See id.
117. See id. (briefly outlining some criticisms of the CAPM).
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and remains a vital analytical tool.
b. Application of Risk Concepts and Capital Asset Pricing Model
(1) Risk Aversion and Venture Capitalists
Applying these concepts to a new start-up venture, suppose that the
venture is attempting to attract investment by venture capitalists. The
venture is not the only one in which a particular venture capitalist can
invest. It is, therefore, competing for the venture capitalist's funds.
Because people are risk averse, under traditional CAPM theory, the
venture capitalist will not select the risky venture unless a correspondingly
higher return is expected.' 18 In other words, the venture capitalist willing
to invest in the risky venture will demand a higher premium for bearing the
risk. The amount of the risk premium, by definition, cannot be quantified
with certainty prior to investment.' 9 According to the CAPM, the higher
risk premium is received by the venture capitalist as compensation for
assuming systematic risk. 20
(2) Risk Aversion and Firm Behavior
The prevailing opinion among economists is that, like individuals,
firms are risk averse.'' Decisions in for-profit firms are made by the
corporate board and management, who are agents of, and accountable to,
their principals, the shareholders. In the for-profit setting, the shareholders'
primary concern is to maximize their profits and, because the board and
management are accountable to the shareholders, a major objective is to
An arbitrage pricing theory approach was developed as an alternative to the CAPM, but it too
has been criticized. See Franco Modigliani & M.H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Financeand the Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 655 (1958); Franco Modigliani & M.H.
Miller, Reply to Heins and Sprenkle, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 592 (1969); Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Reexaminationof the Modigliani-MillerTheorem, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 784 (1969).
118. A decision-maker's knowledge of the probability distribution of alternatives' outcomes
is inadequate where risk exists. See KOUTSOYIANNIS, supra note 97, at 524. Risk preferences must
be known and can be inferred from the decision maker's utility of wealth function. See id.; see also
generally JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) (outlining the utility of wealth function).
119. See FROMM&TAUBMAN, supra note 86; E. MALINVAUD, LECrURESONMICROECONOMIC
THEORY 290-94 (1972).
120. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
121. See FROMM &TAUBMAN, supra note 86, at 7; KOUTSOYIANNIS, supra note 97, at 499529; MALINVAUD, supra note 119, at 296-97 (indicating that "firms behave in the face of risk as
consumers do" and aversion to risk is cause for positive profits). Like under the CAPM, risk
preferences are inferred from a decision maker's expected utility of wealth function, which can be
determined along lines suggested by J. Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. See
KOUTSOYIANNIS, supra note 97, at 524 (citing VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supranote 118).
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satisfy the shareholders' goal. This pressure will theoretically cause
decision-makers of for-profit entities to attempt to maximize profits, 2 2 and
economists explain that apart from competitive imperfections and
disequilibria related to innovations, the risk aversion of firms' decisionmakers accounts for the production of positive profits."2
According to traditional economic theory addressing the investment
decisions of firms, the evaluation of a project is based on the project's total
risk and expected return, without considering either its effects on the total
risk of the firm or on that part of the total risk of the project that can be
diversified away by shareholders through their portfolios.' 24 Within this
approach, a number of models exist for evaluating risky projects. One
model widely used by firms is the weighted average cost of capital model
(WACC), which establishes a risk-adjusted discount rate, or the risk
premium, that a decision-maker will require as a return over time for
investment in a project. " Basically, traditional economic theory provides
that a firm's choice between projects in which to invest funds and labor are
based upon the expected returns, taking into account the risk premium and
probability of risks associated with each project. 2 6
The traditional economic theory approaches each project investment
decision as independent, rather than dependent on other ongoing firm
projects, and as not requiring appraisal of its impact on the firm's expected
total risk and return.' 27 By comparison, modem economic theory uses the
broader framework of portfolio theory to account for the firm's expected
122. Professor Evelyn Brody has asserted that business firms are less profit-maximizing than
shareholders might desire because of control powers, both at policy formulation and operational
levels, delegated to corporate management. See Brody, supra note 53, at 467-71. For illustrative
purposes, one might consider a for-profit firm that utilizes some of its revenues to donate to a
charitable organization rather than to distribute as dividends to shareholders. Certainly in the shortterm, the decision to make the charitable donation does not maximize profits for shareholders.
Moreover, some economists suggest that for-profit firms maximize a utility, such as sales, a budget,
"satisfactory" profits or long-term survival rather than maximizing profits. See id. at 479 (citing
Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories ofNonprofit Organization,in THE NONPROFIT SECrOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, 27, 37 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987)); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESs
BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH 45-52 (rev. ed. 1967); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH,
A BEHAVIORALTHEORYOFTHE FIRM (1963); Saul Levmore, Irreversibilityand the Law: The Size

of Firmsand OtherOrganizations,18 J.CORP.L. 333,336 (1993); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 108 (1955).
123. See MALINVAUD, supra note 119, at 297 (stating that "the caution of firms in the face of
the risk of loss explains why pure profits are on average positive").
124. See, e.g., KOUTSOYIANNIs, supra note 97, at 529.
125. See id. at 542-55 (discussing the weighted average cost of capital model (WACC) and
briefly outlining several shortcomings ofit); see also Jan P. Clement &James D. Suver, The WACC
Method of Estimatingthe Discount Rate, 3 HEALTHCARE FIN. MANGMT. 87, 87-88 (1984).

126. SeegenerallyKOUTSOYIANNIS,supra note 97, at504-29 (examining investment decisions
involving risk).
127. See, e.g., id. at 529.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [], Art. 1
448

FLORIDA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. so

total risk and return.' 2 This "modern" approach is similar to the CAPM.
It suggests that a firm's determination of whether to invest in a particular
project should be viewed in light of the portfolio of existing firm
projects.' 29 It explicitly considers the potential risk and effect of
prospective investments on the risk of the firm as a whole, and it attempts
to maximize total expected returns. 3 ° Although each possible project is
evaluated for its potential risk and expected return, often employing the
WACC model to assist in the determination of the latter, a project also is
placed into the context of the entire portfolio of existing firm projects. 3 '
This fact suggests that possible variations in the expected return on
investment in a particular project will be offset to some extent by
variations in the return on other projects. 3 2 As with the CAPM, investment
in a number of projects should result in the diversification or overall
smoothing of risks. 33 It then follows that because risk and return are
related, where a particular project or portfolio of projects are perceived as
highly risky, a risk averse firm will demand to be compensated with high
returns.1 34 Because it is understood that diversification compensates for
risk that is not systematic, in the perfect market the high returns demanded
with respect to a high risk project or a portfolio of projects should be
attributable to systematic risk alone.
(3) Connecting the Provision of Public Goods and Services with Risk
(a) The For-Profit Start-Up Firm
i. Pure Public Goods
As previously discussed, the provision of pure public goods and
services, whether as strictly or more leniently defined, is clearly associated
with pure risk-that is, the potential for production of loss, but not gain,
realization. 31 Suppose a start-up firm is faced with the opportunity to
128. See id. at 576-77, 600-09.
129. See id. at 600.
130. See id. By explicitly considering the effect of an investment project on the total risk of
the firm, the portfolio approach provides a link between the investment of funds in a particular
project and its impact on the firm's stock price. See id. at 607.
The selection of the most desirable combination of investments in projects can be stated in
another way: choice of investment depends on the firm's utility preferences with respect to net
present value and variance (or standard deviation).
131. See id. at 600-09.
132. See id. at 617-30.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 609.
135. See supra notes 97-102, 105-08 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss3/1

30

Crimm: An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

undertake one of two alternative projects as its sole venture-the provision
of a pure public good or service or of a private good or service for which
there is some potential of either gain or loss realization. Because the firm
is risk averse,' 36 applying either a single project analysis or a portfolio
approach, it will choose the latter project. The former choice could only
result in loss; it could not be diversified and the firm would quickly be
forced to dissolve.137 The latter choice presents the possibility that the firm
might realize gain by its provision of the private portion of the mixed
public good or service. In effect, this gain from the private portion of the
mixed good or service could theoretically cross-subsidize the loss realized
on the provision of the public portion of the good or service.
On the other hand, assume that a start-up firm has the opportunity to
enter into multiple projects, one of which is the provision of a pure public
good or service while the other alternatives include choices to provide a
variety of private goods or services for which there are varying degrees of
speculative risk. Applying modem economic theory incorporating the
portfolio approach, the firm may choose to provide not only one or more
private goods, but also the pure public good or service, depending on its
level of risk aversion and the expected return with respect to offering the
private goods or services. Again, the firm would be cross-subsidizing the
provision of the public good or service by the private goods or services for
which high returns are expected. 3 ' So, for example, a start-up firm formed

136. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
137. This would be true of any firm in the industry even if the risk could be considered
speculative, as the risk of loss would be systematic and could not be diversified. See supra notes
108, 134 and accompanying text.
138. In addition to the potential for gain from the provision of private goods and services, the
firm might realize an intangible gain from offering the public good or service. This intangible gain
would be in the form of enhanced reputation. On a practical level, measurement of the amount of
gain derived from enhanced reputation might be elusive. Under generally accepted accounting
standards, with respect to a for-profit firm, it might be measured from the accounting perspective
of goodwill or going concern value. However, these measurements often do not truly reflect gain
directly attributable to enhanced reputation. See LAWRENCE N. BLOOMBERG, THE INVESTMENT
VALUE OF GOODWILL 9-16 (1938); HUGH P. HUGHES, GOODWILL INACCOUNTING: A HISTORY OF
THEISSUES ANDPROBLEMS 175-207 (1982). In the late 19th century, one author described goodwill
as follows:
It differs from other property, inasmuch as, while other property is palpable,
goodwill is impalpable. Other property can be handled, weighed, or measured, its
nature ascertained by inspection, its quality tested by sight, smell, feeling or
analysis, or the annual income receivable from it identified. But goodwill-how
can its quality be ascertained? The difference between the two kinds of property
is like that between matter and life, or between a man's estate and a man's
character-one is ponderable, the other imponderable.
E. Guthrie, Goodwill, THE ACCOuNTANT 425 (Apr. 23, 1898). A more modem definition reflects
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under state law as a for-profit entity would likely decline to undertake as
its sole project basic scientific research, a broadly defined pure public good
or service, because it would have no possibility of realizing gain.'39
However, if the basic research were part of a package of projects, and the
other projects involved the provision of private goods for which there are
varying degrees of speculative risk, a start-up or established for-profit firm
might decide to conduct the basic research depending on how its loss
would impact expected firm gains from projects involving private goods
and services.
ii. Mixed Public Goods and Services
A mixed public good or service has characteristics of private and pure
public goods or services."4 A start-up firm initially considering whether
to provide a mixed public good or service when no other options are
available would proceed through the same analysis as the start-up firm
having multiple opportunities. Because a mixed public good or service can
be bifurcated into a private portion and a public portion, 4 ' the evaluation
process must include this task, albeit difficult (if not impossible) on a
practical level. 42 If it is perceived that the public portion of the mixed
public good or service exceeds the private portion, then the for-profit startup firm will not undertake the project.'43 On the other hand, if the firm

some of the same sentiments:
Goodwill may be defined as a differential advantage accruing to a corporation in
terms of its dominant goals-the ability to generate superior profits by whatever
means to finance the technostructure's growth, usually by selling goods through
purposeful manipulation of the consumer's customs and habits.
HUGHES, supra,at 194. Other concepts for determining and measuring the reputation ofa for-profit
firm have been suggested to include measurements of social performance, organizational
effectiveness, and their relationship to economic performance data. See generally AHMED RIAHIBELKAOUI, AccOUNTING FOR CORPORATE REPUTATION (1992). With respect to nonprofit
organizations, the accounting concept of goodwill does not arise because the notion of profits is
taboo (at least to the extent of the nondistribution constraint). See generallyROBERT N. ANTHONY
& REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MANAGEMENT CONTROLIN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 34-43 (1980);
MALVERN J. GROSS, JR. ET AL, FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING GUIDE FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (5th ed. 1995); EMERSON 0. HENKE, ACCOUNTING FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS (3rd ed. 1983). For nonprofit organizations, perhaps some measurement of
reputation and trustworthiness might be based on social performance and organizational
effectiveness, but the measurement of these is more qualitative than quantitative in nature.
139. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
141. See id. (discussing the bifurcation of mixed public goods and services).
142. See id.
143. The firm's determination may be difficult to quantify on a practical level. First, it may be
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perceives the private portion to outweigh the public portion, or if the firm
has opportunities to offer additional private goods or services, it may or
may not provide the mixed public good or service depending on the firm's
level of risk aversion and the level of expected returns over time from all
projects. For example, a firm may choose to provide an urban renewal
program in which it replaces slum housing with modem, low-cost
dwellings. Let us assume that a substantial portion of the benefits of a lowcost public housing project inure to the public, which can be valued. It
follows that the public portion would produce only losses, and the amount
of those losses would exceed the gains produced by the quantitatively less
substantial private goods portion. Even in the best instance, if mixed public
goods and services were viewed to entail speculative risk rather than pure
risk, where the significant portion of the benefits of the low-cost public
housing inures to the public, realistically the project could not be expected
to produce high returns without a tax credit or other tax advantage. The
loss potential (or minimal potential for return) would conflict with the high
return required to induce the firm to engage in a high risk investment.
iii. Summary
A rational for-profit start-up firm would not choose to provide a pure
public good or service if it were the only possible project for the firm.
Similarly, it would decide against undertaking a project consisting solely
of the provision of a mixed public good or service where, theoretically, it
could determine that a substantial or significant portion of such good or
service benefits the public. Because in the real world it is unlikely that the
private and public portions could be bifurcated for purposes of evaluating
potential return, it would be unexpected that a for-profit start-up firm
would decide to provide a mixed public good or service knowing the pure
risk associated with the provision of a public good and service. Absent the
government's willingness to directly provide these public goods and
services, another mechanism would be required if the public (or a group
of the public) so demanded. 1"

impossible to bifurcate the probable values to be received from the private portion and from the
public portion of the mixed public good or service. See id. The difficulty may be compounded by
an inability to attach a true value to enhanced reputation that may be part of the gain from the
provision of a mixed public good or service. See supra note 138.
144. Powerful demand by a fairly small group of citizens can induce the creation of a
charitable organization. See Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of
InstitutionalChoice and Government CreatedCharitableOrganizations,41 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
945, 991 (1997).
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(b) The Nonprofit Charitable Organization-Risk Compensation
The nonprofit sector provides the mechanism needed to fill the resultant
void. By law, nonprofit charitable organizations are constrained to make
decisions and conduct activities largely in conformance with their
charitable purposes or missions." This "purpose constraint" effectively
restricts charitable organizations from providing pure and mixed public
goods and services-and on a practical level, most charitable organizations
provide exclusively public services-because these are the types of goods
and services that fit the definition of "charitable" in its "generally accepted
legal sense."' The purpose constraint means for the most part that
noncharitable organizations' portfolios of projects cannot be substantially
diversified because they must consist "exclusively" of public goods and
services.147 Even in multi-faceted organizations such as the United Way,
the portfolio of projects and organizations that it supports is limited to
those that comport with its purpose constraint. As we have seen, the
provider of pure public goods and services, and of mixed public goods and
services, when focusing on the significant public portion (that portion of
the mixed goods and services that benefits the public), assumes pure risk,
for which no pecuniary gains are possible.
Moreover, the expectation of risk of loss may be heightened by the lack
of direct accountability of nonprofit organizations' decision-makers to
stakeholders. Unlike for-profit enterprises, the nondistribution constraint
proscribes stakeholders in nonprofit organizations, and under state laws,

145. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. Although
charitable organizations may undertake an "insignificant" amount of noncharitable activities and
retain their exempt status, they may be subject to taxation on income earned from those
noncharitable activities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 512-513 (1998). State statutes also impose a similar
purpose constraint to that of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See, e.g., N.Y. Not-For-Profit Corp. Law § 201(b)
(McKinney 1998) (providing that "[a] not-for-profit corporation of this type [Type B] may be
formed for any one or more of the following non-business purposes: charitable").
146. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. A majority of nonprofit organizations
produce mixed goods or services. See Cyril F. Chang & Howard P. Tuckman, The Goods Produced
By Nonprofit Organizations,24 PUB. FIN. Q. 25, 38-40 (1996).
147. The exclusivity language is found in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)(1998), and has been interpreted
to mean "primarily." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (as amended in 1990).
This is not to say that, despite the constraints imposed on charitable organizations, many
nonprofit organizations have not diversified by forming for-profit subsidiaries. The health care
subsector of the nonprofit sector is a prime example of this diversification through the formation
of a variety of entity arrangements and ventures. For a general discussion of some of these entity
arrangements and ventures, see Crimm, supra note 3, at 84-100; Darryll K. Jones, Creating
Complex Monsters: Joint OperatingAgreements andthe Logical Invalidity of Treas. Reg. 1.5021(b), 19 EXEMPIr ORG.TAX REV. 165, 165-88 (1998); Nicole A. Reuschel, Note, The Centerpiece
of Health CareReform-Integrated Delivery Systems: Confronting Tax Code Challenges That
Threaten Health Care Integration, 30 SUEFOLK U. L. REV. 825, 841-50 (1997); Reed Abelson,
Charities Use For-ProfitUnits to Avoid Disclosing Finances,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1998, at Al.
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nonprofit organizations are not the agent of particular donors or
beneficiaries.'48 Consequently, unlike for-profit firms, "in most nonprofits
there is no clear category of principals" to whom agents, the governing
boards, officers, and managers, are directly answerable.1 49 Although
nonprofit decision-makers/agents are indirectly accountable to the public
with respect to their charitable missions and practices, the lack of direct
accountability to a category of principals has meant occasional, and
sometimes infamous, abuses with significant pecuniary and reputational
losses by the charitable organization. 50
Despite the lack of expected gains, the literature reveals that nonprofit
organizations make project investment decisions in the same manner as do
for-profit entities."5 ' The same economic forces motivate for-profit and
nonprofit organizations. 5 2 Management must make investment decisions
in light of expected risks and uncertainties. Then, as with for-profit
firns, charitable organizations likely are risk averse. 3 It should
follow that as providers of goods and services, nonprofits must be
compensated, albeit for furnishing public goods and services.
Without some form of compensation, even nonprofit organizations
would not be enticed to supply public goods and services. Economists
Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind have demonstrated the importance
of compensating for risks associated with investments in public goods and

148. For example, in New York, a charitable corporation holds full ownership rights in
donated assets and is not considered a trustee over the assets. See N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law
§ 513(a) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1998). Nonetheless, a charitable corporation's governing board
is obligated to use those assets earmarked by the donor in accordance with the donor's stated
purpose. See id. § 513(b). It is the state Attorney General who generally has supervision and
oversight responsibilities on behalf of donors and the public. See, e.g., id. § 112; CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 5142, 5250, 6511, 9230 (Deering 1997); Rev. Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 1.7, 3.04, 8.10,
14.03-14.04.
149. Brody, supra note 53, at 465.
150. See, e.g., Thomas J. Billitteri, Goodwill Looting: CaliforniaScam Yields Lessons for
CharityManagers,CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 12, 1998, at 39; Brett D. Fromson, Stock Sale to
Multiply Robertsons' Riches, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 1992, at Dl; William H. Honan, Campus in
Turmoil: A Special Report; Adelphi, a Little University With Big Ideas,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997,
at B1; awrence Ingrassia, Boston University Targetedby State ForAllegedAbuses, WALLST. J.,
Mar. 16,1993, at B 10; JenniferMoore, 2 YearsLater,a Scandal'sLegacy,CHRON.PHILANTHROPY,
May 17, 1994, at 28.
151. See FROMM &TAUBMAN, supra note 86, at 28-51, 69-72,306-11; LEvY, supra note 83,
at 135-46.
152. See Brody, supra note 53,460.
153. See FROMM & TAUBMAN, supra note 86, at 71. This notion may be supported under
public finance theory, especially for those nonprofits that metamorphose into defacto government
enterprises as their dependency on the public sector increases, or functionally are identical or nearly
the same as government operations. See id. at 528; EL GINSBERG, et al., THE PLURALISTIC
ECONOMY 23 (1965); FROMM &TAUBMAN, supra note 86, at 71-72; infra notes 154-55.
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services in the same manner as for private investments. 5 4 It is clearly
accepted under public finance theory that such compensation is achievable
through the risk premium or expected return over time. 55 Yet, in the real
world there is no high risk premium directly generated by the provision of
public goods; the provider directly realizes only loss or, at best, minimal
gain. 15 6 Therefore, to entice a charitable organization to offer public goods
and services, there must be an "insurer" to provide some level of expected
return. That "insurer," historically and currently, is the government,7 and it
has employed the tax exemption as the "insurance" mechanism.11
4. Risk Compensation Theory as Universally Defensible
The question arises as to whether the tax exemption is a universally

154. See Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public
Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 364 (1970).
155. See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text; see also J. Hirshleifer, Investment
Decision Under Uncertainty: Choice-TheoreticApproaches, 79 Q. J. ECON. 509, 531 (1965); J.
Hirshleifer, Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Applications of the State-Preference
Approach, 80 Q. J.ECON. 252,268-77 (1966). It has been argued that if risk were treated differently
for public investment than for private investment, the public sector would over-invest at the expense
of private investments yielding higher returns. See id.
156. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text.
157. It is widely accepted that a proportional tax having a full loss offset increases personal
risk taking. In other words, investors will be enticed to engage in risky activities if they know that
any gains yielded from the activities may be directly offset by losses. This is accomplished through
tax credits, deductions, and capital gains preferences. See, e.g., Evsey D. Domar & Richard A.
Musgrave, ProportionalIncome Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q. J. EcoN. 388, 388-90 (1944)
(analyzing investment projects as independent, and originally suggesting proposition that complete
loss offset increases risk activity); J. Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25
REV. EC. STUDIES 65, 80-82 (1958) (applying an expected utility, indifference curve analysis to
demonstrate that a tax with full loss offset results in taking an increased public risk). But see Martin
S. Feldstein, The Effects of Taxation on Risk Taking, 77 J. POLECON. 755,755 (1969) (disagreeing
with assertion that proportional taxation causes persons who maximize expected utility to increase
risk). Some economists have indicated that certain taxes are more effective than others in
accomplishing the inducement goal. See, e.g., J. E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and
Capital GainsTaxation on Risk-Taking, 83 Q. J. ECON. 263, 279 (1969). Economists disagree as
to the effect of progressive taxation on risk-taking. See, e.g., Syed M. Ahsan, ProgressionandRiskTaking,26 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS-NEW SERIES 318,325-26 (1974) (indicating that risk-taking
is greaterunder linear progressive income taxes than understrictly proportional income taxes); John
C. Fellingham & Mark A. Wolfson, ProgressiveIncome Taxes and the Demandfor Risky Assets,
37 NAT'L TAX FIN. 127, 127-29 (1984) (stating that a progressive income tax induces a strict
preference for risk-free assets); Michael Waterson, On ProgressiveTaxation and Risk-Taking, 37
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 510, 510 (1985) (demonstrating undue specificity of assertion that
progressive taxation promotes public risk-taking investments). A number of scholars have
questioned or encouraged the appropriateness of income tax mechanisms for encouraging
investment in risky activities. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture,
and the Taxation of High-Risk Activities, 48 TAX L. REV. 163, 163-82 (1993) (discussing
appropriateness); Stiglitz, supra,at 281 (questioning the appropriateness).
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defensible means of inducing all types of risk averse charitable
organizations to provide public goods and services. On one level, it
appears universally appropriate. The government represents the public and
pools public funds via taxation. By exempting certain organizations from
income taxation, but subjecting other entities and individuals to taxation,
the government redistributes wealth to the exempt organizations (that is,
the government pays a risk premium). Moreover, the government shifts to,
and spreads among, taxpayers the risk of loss associated with the provision
of public goods and services by tax supported charitable organizations.'
This spread of risk can be illustrated most easily with a public good that is
supplied solely by the government, national defense. The risk of loss
associated with the provision of national defense is spread among all
investors in the government, that is, among all taxpayers who pay for
national defense and cannot expect to receive (and do not receive)
pecuniary gain from it. The same analysis would apply to public goods and
services provided by charitable organizations, for which the tax exemption
represents the expected return for risk of loss associated with the public
portion of the goods or services. Because the tax exemption is considered
by some as a loss of revenue for the government, from the perspective of
taxpayers, they are bearing the costs of the charitable organization's
provision of pure public goods and services, and of the expected returns
associated with the public portion of mixed goods or services. Yet,
taxpayers expect and receive no pecuniary return for investing their funds
(through tax payments) in the government's support of charitable
organizations and their projects. This approach argues that the tax
exemption is universally defensible, yet, on another level, every charitable
organization may not deserve the tax exemption."'
5. Deservedness-A Separate Issue
a. In the Beginning-A Start-Up Charitable Organization
Relying on the above economic theories alone, a new or start-up
charitable organization deserves tax exempt treatment on its initial income
source, the receipt of donations."6 As a result of the purpose constraint, a
158. See Arrow & Lind, supra note 154, at 375 (indicating that the costs of risk-bearing are
negligible when shouldered by the public at large, which the government represents); Livingston,
supra note 157, at 176-77.
159. Professors Hall and Colombo concluded that all charitable organizations may not deserve
the tax exemption, and that deservedness should depend on the level of donations that an
organization is able to attract. See Hall & Colombo, supranote 66, at 1446-73. For a discussion of
the donative theory, see supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
160. Even without this theory, the charitable organization would be entitled to exempt from
taxation the value of a charitable donation received. See I.R.C. § 102(a)(1998).
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start-up charitable organization must dedicate all donations received
61
"exclusively" to projects that carry out its specified charitable mission.1
Expected returns will be required not only to entice the donations from
donors, but also to induce management to carry out the wishes of donors
to provide the "inherently risky" public goods and services. In other words,
without the tax deduction for the donors,162 and absent the tax exemption
for a start-up charitable organization on which we are focused, returns
would be nonexistent or inadequate. 163 The tax exemption is a charitable

161. See supra notes 24, 147 and accompanying text.
162. There has been frequent criticism of the charitable contribution deduction. Some critics
argue that wealthy donors wield more power to prompt the formation of charitable organizations
and are advantaged more than the poor or the majority of the voting public. These representation
and upside-down effects are viewed as inequitable. See, e.g., Mark G. Kelman, Personal
DeductionsRevisited: Why They Fit Poorlyin an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in
a FarFrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 856-58 (1979). These offensives have met return
criticisms. See Professor A. Burton Weisbrod indicates that the representation effect is a naive
expectation that the voting public and its elected politicians would always produce optimal results.
Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of a Voluntary NonprofitSector in a Three-Sector Economy,
in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFRT INST1TUTIONS 21 (S.Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). Harold M.
Hochman and James D. Rodgers respond that the upside-down effect is not disturbing if the cost
of a deduction to the less wealthy in the form of foregone governmental services or increased taxes
is offset by the benefit to them of the additional expenditure on charity by the wealthy. Harold M.
Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The OptimalTax Treatmentof CharitableContributions,30 NAT.
TAXJ. 1, 10-13 (1977).
In some respects, a donor to a new charitable organization is similar to a venture capitalist
considering investment in a risky venture and requiring compensation in the form of higher
expected returns. See supranotes 118-20 and accompanying text. For a donor, the expected return
may take several forms. First, the philanthropist will obtain the charitable deduction of I.R.C. § 170.
Second, the donor may receive in return an intangible benefit, such as religious benefits, of access
to tickets for usage of pews on particular religious holidays. See Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C. B. 49;
Gregory I. Devorkin, Dual CharacterContributions:A ProposedPenalty to Deter Charitiesfrom
ProvidingErroneousInformation Regarding Deductibility, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 277-300 (1992);
Daniel Rattin Mitz, Save Your Local Church orSynagogue: When Are Taxpayer Contributionsto
Religious OrganizationsDeductible UnderSection 170?, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 840, 855-57 (1988);
Jacob L. Todres, InternalRevenue Code Section 170: Does the Receipt bya Donorofan Intangible
Religious Benefit Reduce the Amount of the CharitableContributionDeduction? Only the Lord
Knowsfor Sure, 64TENN. L. REV. 91,92 (1996); Note, A Line Drawnby Unsteady Hands:Section
170 CharitableContributions,andReturn Benefits in Hernandez v. C.I.R., 23 AKRONL. REV. 575,
581 (1990). Third, the benefactor may receive a return in the intangible form of feeling a sense of
self-satisfaction from "altruism." See Crimm, supra note 80, at 687-89.
163. Critics might assert that the tax exemption as a substitute for a return on investments is
flawed by attempts to achieve indirectly what properly should be addressed directly and more
efficiently through grants and by inequities. Both sides to the former criticism have been argued in
the literature for years. These are the same arguments for and against the subsidy theory. See supra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text. The second argument is a proportionality argument. However,
as with the donative theory, because the theory uses as a foundation the failure of the government
and-the private market to provide public goods, "[tihe political stalemate that prevents a direct
government subsidy means that, however flawed, an implicit subsidy through the tax system is the
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organization's return on its investment in the public portion of public
goods and services, and its very nature assures non-volatile returns."
Another supporting argument justifying the tax exemption is culturally
based. The start-up charitable organization merely represents an expression
of the interests of the initial groups of donors; it is the legal form of
carrying out their intent. These donors are pioneering efforts to provide
risky public goods and services, and to exempt from taxation donations
received by the charitable organization, approval is communicated that this
country continues to support and revere risk taking, especially those
associated with socially admirable goals.' 65 Thus, the tax exemption is
justified initially for a start-up charitable organization.
b. Beyond the Initial Start-Up Phase-Evolution or the Cloning Effect?
As a charitable organization proceeds through time, several things often
occur. First, the institution hopes to, and may continue, to receive
additional charitable contributions. Second, it may expand the type and
nature of its projects. Third, it may receive funds from other sources, such
as returns from providing the private portion of mixed public goods or
services and income from noncharitable activities. I suggest that these
occurrences will bear on the deservedness of the charitable organization to
retain its tax exemption beyond its initial start-up phase.
The most important measure of success of a charitable organization is
the accomplishment of its mission-related purposes. Two scholars have
suggested that this achievement can be measured by the magnitude of
donations received by a charitable organization. 6 As a charitable
organization develops and continues to receive additional donations, the
tax exemption is justified as long as the donations are used to fund projects
that meet the organization's purpose constraint. The same should be true
of relatively insignificant returns realized from providing the private
portion of mixed public goods and services and from other sources. These

only available mechanism for subsidy." Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 1386. The tax
exemption does not suffer from the same criticisms of inequities, overbreadth, and discouragement
to the disposition of capital assets due to potential tax effects from the bunching of income. For a
discussion of these issues, see WiuLA A. KLEIN ET AL,FEDERALINCOME TAXATION 826-28 (8th
ed. 1990); Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247
(1957); Livingston, supra note 157, at 191-93; James M. Poterba, Capital Gains Tax Policy
Toward Entrepreneurship,42 NAT'LTAX J. 375, 382 (1989).
164. Investors obviously prefer stable returns over volatile returns because stable returns
clearly make an investment less risky. The stable returns of the tax exemption are effectively the
government sharing the risk of loss. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text (commenting
on the government acting as the insurer and effectively pooling the risk among the public).
165. See Livingston, supra note 157, at 165.
166. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 316, 390; Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at
1450-58; see also supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing the donative theory).
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resources should be permitted to cross-subsidize charitable activities
67
without negatively impacting the organization's tax exemption.
However, as time progresses, initial donors and managers will become
more removed from the organization. New contributors, managers, and
beneficiaries will replace the original players. 161 Public needs will evolve.
Suppose these subsequent generations of philanthropists, managers,
beneficiaries, and public needs venture far from satisfying the intent of the
initial pioneering benefactors and managers and from fulfilling the original
purpose of the organization. When a charitable organization's projects are
related only remotely to its original purpose, a moral ethic that creates an
obligation and expectation from one generation to the next is breached.
Under this notion, I would submit that the moral ethic is cloning-that is,
the replication over time of the nonprofit organization and its original
purpose-and the tax exemption may not be justified for those
organizations that do not continue to "clone" themselves as time
progresses.169 Pursuant to this rather myopic view, the exemption may not
be justified for charitable organizations that evolve over time.170

167. For example, a nonprofit academic hospital may collect from the government, a private
insurer or the patient amounts in excess of the costs incurred in providing the private portion of the
mixed public good. That gain could be utilized to support basic scientific research or to facilitate
teaching residents, part of the charitable mission of an academic health center. For a discussion of
cross-subsidization and academic health centers, see Crimm, supra note 80, at 677-84; see also
Estelle James, How Nonprofits Grow: A Model, 2 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 350, 352-354
(1983) (demonstrating that nonprofits can use surplus funds from selling private goods to crosssubsidize production of public goods); Dennis Young, Entrepreneurshipand the Behavior of
Nonprofit Organizations:Elements ofa Theory, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1988) (cross-subsidization can be accentuated by nonprofits headed
by entrepreneurs).
168. The indefinite class of public beneficiaries will not really change unless public needs
evolve and the charitable mission of the organization changes in tandem. However, where a
charitable organization provides mixed public goods or services, the specific private beneficiaries
will change. For example, if a nonprofit hospital is created to serve the general public, its customer
base likely will remain fairly constant, but its specific patients will change through the years.
169. For a brief discussion of moral ethics in the context of choice, see Edmund S. Phelps, The
Indeterminacyof Game EquilibriumGrowth in the Absence of an Ethic,in ALTRUISM, MORAUTY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 87, 101 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).
170. This lack ofjustification mightbe magnified if the charitable organization provides mixed
public goods or services only, such as a church, synagogue or health care organization. The
subsequent generations of donors, managers, and consumers may change dramatically in interests,
attitude and composition. This evolution in persons may force the evolved church, synagogue, or
hospital to be substantially different from the original organization. For example, a synagogue may
be formed and funded by individuals who represent the Orthodox branch of Judaism. Over time,
however, because of externalities, such as migration patterns, the congregation (i.e., the donors and
direct beneficiaries) may consist of persons who represent either the Conservative, Reform, or
Progressive branch of Judaism.
This idea is alluded to by Professor Avner Ben-Ner without reference to the passage of time.
See Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public Policy
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However, "the role of morals may be filled more primitively by a myth
that recounts the evil consequences to a society that would depart from
some traditional pattern of behavior...' If every generation were to act "in
such a way as to validate earlier assumptions as to how it will act and,
given these assumptions, no generation acting alone can increase its
estimated overall utility . . . then cooperative action among the
generations," assuming it was enforceable, "could produce an
improvement in every generation's utility."'7 And, is not improvement in
every generation's utility desirable? As one economist has summarized this
sentiment:
Under the Paretian ethic-where any change that is preferred
by at least one person is counted a social gain if it is not
opposed by the others-each generation would presumably
anticipate the economy's approach to the Golden Rule state
because each prefers that [growth] equilibrium path to the
other ones. Then the game-equilibrium growth path, shaped
by the partially selfish preferences of each passing generation,
would indeed approach the Golden Rule state.l 3
Another argument supporting tax exemption for certain evolving
charitable organizations is one of transitivity or dynamic gamesmanship
over a sequentially indefinite time frame. 74 This gamesmanship, suggested
by economist Peter Hammond, is based on cooperation among players
where the cooperation takes the form of holding a certain set of beliefs
about the strategy of other players.7 It provides that a donor in one
generation takes into account the expected generosity of subsequent
generations of donors, and that subsequent generations of donors take into
account past generosity.' 76 Specifically, it envisions that individual A (first

Towards Nonprofit Organizations,104 YALE L. J. 731, 761-62 (1994). He suggests that many
nonprofits suffer from "control failure," which he defines as the failure to engage in control or to
exercise sufficient control by demand-side stakeholders (including some consumers, donors, and
sponsors). See id.Professor Ben-Nerindicates that nonprofit control failure can result in nonprofits'
providing---"services based on the preferences of those who control them, leading others to
patronize the organization less than they otherwise would have, or to leave it entirely.
Policy towards nonprofit organizations should target the customers, donors and sponsors." Id.
171. Phelps, supra note 169, at 101. Professor Phelps argues that this strict moral path
approach would be a disservice to society. See id.
172. Id. at 87.
173. Id. at 101-02.
174. See Peter Hammond, Charity: Altruism or Cooperative Egoism?, in ALTRUISM,
MORAITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 169, at 115-17.
175. See id. at 123; see also, generally, JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN,
THEORY OFGAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953).
176. See Hammond, supra note 174, at 117-20, 124-29.
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generation) can only expect individual B (second generation) to be
charitable later if individual B also expects individual C (third generation)
to be charitable still later.'77 Each A, B, and C cooperate only if he or she
determines that the earlier generation has cooperated in the agreement, and
believes that later generations will cooperate in the future. If one individual
breaches the individuals' "intertemporal agreement," the stream of
donations will cease and the charitable organization that A pioneered will
be forced to dissolve for lack of funding. There is great incentive to live up
to the intertemporal agreement, particularly if some personal
benefit-pecuniary through a charitable tax deduction, or nonpecuniary,
such as maintenance of elite social status, access to special goods or
services,IT-is obtained by each donor. There is nothing in the theory to
wed each generation of donors to the same view of the purpose for which
the donation will be utilized by the donee organization. Although perhaps
a leap, one might suggest that it is more important to donors that the
charitable organization continue to thrive and to broadly carry out its
purpose constraint than to be so restricted by the initial donor's intent that
subsequent generations of donors would be unwilling to make donations.
A final argument supporting the tax exemption for certain evolving
charitable organizations is founded on the concept of the term "charitable."
As previously indicated, its amorphousness has prevented it from
becoming a stagnant notion.17 9 It has taken into account the facts, that over
time, demands on society have changed, social needs have evolved, and
public policy has developed. 8 0

177. See id.
178. For a discussion of why individuals donate to charitable organizations, see John A. Baird,
Why People Give, in CHARITABLE GIVING AND SOLICITATION 510, at 641 (1995); Chang &
Tuckman, supra note 146, at 29; Charles T. Clotfelter, FederalTax Policy and CharitableGiving,
in PHLATOPIC GIVING: STUDIES INVARIETIES AND GOALS 105, 111 (Richard Magat ed., 1989);
see also Crimm, supra note 80, at 687-89; Michael F. Luck, The Mystique of Reciprocity, 2 ASS'N
FOR HEALTHCARE PHILANTHROPY J. 41, 41 (1992); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Non-profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, 171, 187-88, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY
AND ECONOMIC THEORY, supra note 169; Laura Sessions Stepp, Focus on Self Has Changed
Language of Sacrifice: CharitableGroups ReportAttitude of Giving to Feel Good, Not Giving
Until It Hurts,WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1991, at A20.
179. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. By virtue of the courts having explicitly
indicated that the concept of charitable must take into account public policy, what is considered
charitable will not be entirely constant. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,585-88
(1983) (holding that public policy must enter into determination of whether an organization is
charitable); 97th Cong., 225,229-32 (1982) (Statement of R.T. McNamar, Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury) Hearings on Legislation to Deny Tax Exemption to Racially Discriminatory Private
Schools (commenting on the concern of the federal district court in Bob Jones University about
permitting IRS to determine on its own public policies that would deny tax exemption, especially
since federal public policy constantly changes).
180. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586-90.
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c. Summary
In summary, a strong argument can be made for the continued
justification of a charitable organization's tax exemption as long as the
organization's resources are employed to cultivate its purpose constraint
in a constructive, progressive, and tolerant fashion. The same argument
cannot be made if, as time proceeds, an organization uses resources to
engage in some noncharitable activities-that is, activities that are
unrelated to its purpose constraint.
In the latter instance, the organization may invest resources in
noncharitable activities for a variety of reasons, including the perceived
need to compete with other nonprofit or for-profit entities, or the
perception that expected return on investment might be substantially
greater for noncharitable activities. Regardless of the reason for investing
resources in noncharitable activities, it seems appropriate that, at the very
least, the organization should lose its tax exemption with respect to income
from those activities. If the investment in noncharitable activities is more
than insubstantial in magnitude and thus rivaling the charitable purpose
constraint, the organization's tax exemption should be revoked. This
treatment is sanctioned currently by Internal Revenue Code provisions and
the courts.'

181. I.R.C. §§ 501,512-514 (1998). Under the judicially created "commerciality doctrine,"
the courts and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have considered that an activity conducted in a
"commercial manner" is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose and hence is a "nonexempt
activity." Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581-82 (1924). In Sagrada
Orden, the commerciality doctrine was first created in the context of a religious order that the IRS
allegedly engaged in activities that were not tax-exempt but "operated also for business and
commercial purposes." Id. at 581. The Court stated there was no "competition" although the
"transactions yield some profit" which was deemed "in the circumstances a negligible factor." See
also Better Business Bureau, Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1945) (in which the
Court connected the doctrine with the "exclusivity requirement" of I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) and denied
the tax exemption because the institution had a "commercial hue" and its activities were "largely
animated by this commercial purpose"); Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381
(1984) (discussing and applying commerciality doctrine to a religion founded by L. Ron Hubbard).
For a discussion of the commerciality doctrine, see James Bennet & Gabriel Rudney, A
Commerciality Test to Resolve the Commercial Nonprofit Issue, 36 TAX NOTES 1095 (1985);
Crimm, supra note 3, at 36-38; HOPKINS, supra note 28, at 833-42; Bruce R. Hopkins, The Most
Important Conceptin the Law of Tax-Exempt OrganizationsToday: The CommercialityDoctrine,
5 EXEMPTORG.TAXREV. 459 (1992); Paul J. Streer, ObtainingandPreservingTax-Exempt Status
UnderSection 501(c)(3): JudiciallyDevelopedFactorsforDetectingthe Presenceof Substantial
Nonexempt Activities, J. AM. TAX ASS'N, Spring 1985, at 63.
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CONCLUSION

The issue of the deservedness of a charitable organization to the tax
exemption is separate from the question of what is the rationale for
conferring the tax exemption on charitable organizations. This Article has
sought primarily to address the latter by relying primarily on economic
theory. It proposes that the tax exemption for charitable organizations is
compensation for the provision of public goods and services, which are
inherently risky activities for which positive financial expected return is
otherwise zero or minimal. The tax exemption essentially creates a
marketplace for the provision of public goods and services where no
market otherwise would exist. It induces charitable organizations to
provide these goods and services which neither the private sector, which
is not unlike the nonprofit sector in its investment decision-making
processes, nor government is willing or able to provide in adequate
quantity.
As a separate issue, the Article suggests that not all charitable
organizations deserve the tax exemption. It attempts to propose broad
guidelines for determining whether a charitable organization should be
entitled to the exemption. It suggests that basic to worthiness are the
projects carried on by the institution and the degree to which those
activities comport with the organization's initial purpose constraint.
The benefits to society of fostering the continued development of the
nonprofit sector cannot be overemphasized. As time proceeds, public
policy and industries change. The crucial role of charitable organizations
in the provision of essential goods and services to the public will persist.
Therefore, it is imperative that tax policy supports these nonprofit
institutions.
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